A critical study of the legal framework regulating strikes and strike violence in South Africa. by Mohale, Thabo.





A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING STRIKES 











THIS RESEARCH PROJECT IS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE 
REGULATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF BUSINESS LAW IN THE 
COLLEGE OF LAW AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 




DR. ERNEST MLUNGISI TENZA 
 
 





I, Thabo Mohale, hereby declare that:  
 
1. This dissertation is my own work and I have not copied the work of another student or 
author; 
  
2. This dissertation is the result of my own unaided research and has not been previously 
submitted in part or in full for any other degree or to any other University; 
 
3. The written work is entirely my own except where other sources are acknowledged; 
  
4. Collaboration in the writing of this dissertation or the copying of another student’s 
work constitutes cheating for which I may be excluded from the University;  
 
5. This dissertation has not been submitted in this or similar form in another module at 
this or any other University; and 
  
6. This project is an original piece of work which is made available for photocopying 
and for inter library loan. 
 
Signature: …………………………  
Thabo Mohale (216077112)  
Date:  4 December 2017 
 
  




To my Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, thank you. It is by your grace that I am able to complete 
this task.  
 
To my late father, Reuben Mohale, your love, wisdom and strength continue to guide and 
protect me. Thank you for instilling in me the belief that I too, through Jesus, can do great 
things. 
 
To my fiancée, Vivian, and our son, Tukisho. You will never know how much your love, 
patience, and understanding inspires me. This dissertation is dedicated to you. 
  
To my mother Maureen Motsisi. Thank you for your support and prayers. 
 
To my uncle, Lekgothoane Mohale. Thank you for your constant support and encouragement. 
  
To my family and friends. Thank you for your unwavering support.  
 
To my supervisor, Dr Tenza. Thank you for your patience, encouragement, and guidance. Your 
knowledge and deep insight into the topic helped steer the ship well. Thank you.  
 
To Carla and Alexandra Pettit. Thank you for your tireless work in editing the dissertation.  
 




4 | P a g e  
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AD   Appellate Division 
AMCU Association of Mine and Construction Workers Union 
AMPLATS Anglo American Platinum Mines 
CC  Constitutional Court 
CCMA Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions 
CWU  Communication Workers Union 
Ed  Edition 
FAWU Food and Allied Workers Union 
GN   Government Notice 
GSJ   South Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg 
IC  Industrial Court 
ICCPR  International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
ILJ  Industrial Law Journal 
ILO   International Labour Organisation 
IR   Industrial Reports 
JP   Judge President 
JOL   Journal of Business Law 
KZD  KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban 
LAC  Labour Appeal Court 
LC  Labour Court 
LLM   Master of Laws 
LRA  Labour Relations Act 
LRAA  Labour Relations Amendment Act 
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council 
NEHAWU  National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union 
NUM   National Union of Mineworkers 
NUMSA  National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa 
PELJ   Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
PPWAWU  Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union 
POPCRU  Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union 
5 | P a g e  
 
PTWU  Professional Transport Workers Union 
RGA   Regulation of Gatherings Act 
RSA   Republic of South Africa 
SA   South Africa 
SACCAWU  South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union 
SADC   Southern African Development Community 
SAJHR  South African Journal on Human Rights 
SALJ   South African Law Journal 
SAPO   South African Post Office 
SA Merc LJ  South African Mercantile Law Journal 
SAMWU  South African Municipal Workers Union 
SAPS  South African Police Service 
SASLAW  South African Society for Labour Law 
SATAWU  South African Transport and Allied Workers Union 
SCA   Supreme Court of Appeal 
Stell LR  Stellenbosch Law Review 
TAWUSA  Transport and Allied Workers Union of South Africa 
THRHR  Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
TWU   Transport Workers Union 
Vol   Volume 
 
  
6 | P a g e  
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: General introduction 
1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….8 
2 The nature of strikes and strike violence…………………………………………………….9 
3 Research methodology……………………………………………………………………...10 
4 Rationale for the study……………………………………………………………………...10 
5 Statement of the problem…………………………………………………………………...11 
6 Purpose of the study………………………………………………………………………...11 
7 Research questions………………………………………………………………………….11 
8 Literature review…………………………………………………………………………....12 
9 Structure of the research……………………………………………………………………16 
 
Chapter 2: Overview of the right to strike in SA 
1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...17   
2 Collective bargaining ………………………………………………………………………17 
3 The right to strike …………………………………………………………………………..18 
3.1 The statutory definition of the right to strike……………………………………...20 
3.2 Protected and unprotected strikes…………………………………………………20 
3.3 Limitations on the right to strike…………………………………………………..21 
4 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………....31 
 
Chapter 3: The causes of strike violence 
1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...32 
2 Factors that cause violence during strikes 
2.1 Structural violence………………………………………………………………..33 
2.2 Majoritarianism…………………………………………………………………..36 





7 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 4: The liability of trade unions and members for strike-related violence 
1 Introduction…………………………………………….…………………………………..58 
2 Grounds for holding union and/or members liable 
2.1 Liability on the basis of misconduct………………………………………………58 
2.2 Liability on the basis of vicarious liability………………………………………...70 
2.3 Revocation of protection………………………………………………………….76 
3 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….83 
 
Chapter 5: Statutory remedies in terms of the LRA and the RGA  
1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...84 
2 Remedies in terms of section 68 of the LRA 
2.1 Interdict…………………………………………………………………………...84 
2.2 Just and equitable compensation………………………………………………….94 
2.3 Dismissal…………………………………………………………………………98 
3 Liability in terms of the RGA……………………………………………………………...104 
4 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………..110 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations    
1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….112  
2 Majoritarianism…………………………………………………………………………...113 
3 Balloting…………………………………………………………………………………..113 
4 Replacement labour……………………………………………………………………….114 




8 | P a g e  
 




The coming into effect of the Constitution1 of South Africa ushered in a new political and 
legislative dispensation in South Africa (hereafter ‘SA’). In the area of labour or industrial 
relations, the Constitution affords workers the rights to freedom of association, strike, engage 
in collective bargaining, assemble, demonstrate, picket, and present petitions.2 To give effect 
to these labour rights, the Constitution mandated the legislature to enact legislation that 
specifically regulates them. As a result the LRA3 was enacted in 1995. The purpose of the LRA 
is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace, and the democratisation of 
the workplace.4 This is also in keeping with international standards of recognising and 
protecting the right to freedom of association5 and the right to strike,6 which the Constitutional 
Court has confirmed the validity and importance of.7 
 
It will be noted that the rights conferred by the Constitution and the LRA are not absolute, but 
may be limited in terms of s 36(1) of the Constitution taking into account public interest and 
the conflicting rights of others.8 
 
                                                          
1 Act No. 200 of 1993. 
2 Ss 23 and 17 of the Constitution of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 (Hereafter ‘the Constitution’) and s 64 of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (Hereafter ‘the LRA’). See also A Basson et al. Essential Labour Law 5 ed 
(2009) 303. 
3 The LRA supra note 2. 
4 S 1 of the LRA. 
5 ILO Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention of 1949. 
6 N Smith and E Fourie ‘Equity Aviation v SATAWU (478/09) [2011] ZASCA 232’ (2012) 27 De Jure 426, 430. 
7 SB Gericke ‘Revisiting the liability of trade unions and or their members during strikes: Lessons to be learnt 
from case law’ (2012) 75 THRHR 566, 580. 
8 s36 Limitation of rights 
‘(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality, and freedom, also taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’ 
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2  The nature of strikes and strike violence 
 
The right to strike is well entrenched in South Africa.9 Strikes are essentially an arsenal in the 
employees’ weaponry to collectively bargain with the traditionally much more powerful 
employer. Strikes attempt to balance the scales of power between employer and employee by 
allowing employees to withhold their labour, thus negatively impacting the employer’s output, 
and ultimately, profits. Unlawful violence has come in many forms, including physical assaults 
on management and non-striking employees, vandalising and thrashing property, blockading 
entrances to business, intimidation.10 The list does not end there. One only needs to recall the 
Marikana Massacre where 34 mineworkers were killed, 78 wounded and more than 250 people 
were arrested.11 
 
Although inherently laudable, strikes have, however, been tainted with unlawful acts of 
violence which have tarnished the otherwise legitimate philosophy upon which legitimate 
strike action is premised. An investigation into this inadvertent nuisance, namely strike 
violence, forms the subject-matter of this dissertation. 
 
Due to the prevalence of strikes in SA, one can argue that strike violence has become the norm. 
This was vividly demonstrated in the recent case of NUM and Others v Power Construction 
(Pty) Ltd12 where a witness who had been a trade union organiser for over five years, whilst 
refusing to acknowledge that the employees had engaged in an unprotected strike, testified that:  
 
‘To me a strike is when people are damaging people’s property, then holding sticks and 
stuff like that. That is why I do not agree with you. That is how I am explaining a 
strike.’13 
 
In reaction to this testimony, the court rightfully expressed its concerns thus: 
 
                                                          
9 S 23(2)(c)  of the Constitution. 
10 M Tenza ‘causes of violent strikes in South Africa’ law democracy & development 211. 
11 http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012, accessed on 17 May 2017. 
12 (C85/2014) [2016] ZALCCT 24; (2017) 38 ILJ 227 (LC).  
13 Ibid para 57. 
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‘… It is, to say the least, shocking that a trade union organiser with five years’ 
experience would equate a strike to wilful damage to property.’14 
 
This misconceived outlook on strikes has far-reaching consequences on the economy, the lives 
and physical well-being of the striking and non-striking employees, and those in the vicinity of 
the strikes, whether in person or property, and on the economy as a whole. Needless to say, it 
is imperative that solutions are found that will rid SA of this scourge.  
 
3  Research Methodology  
 
The study adopts a qualitative approach as well as a literature review on the subject. The 
Constitution and various relevant legislations will be considered in answering the research 
questions, which are primarily concerned with the causes of strike violence and the imputation 
of liability flowing therefrom. The legal framework regarding protected and unprotected strikes 
will be reviewed. There will also be a discussion of scholarly commentary and the 
jurisprudence handed down from the judiciary, both locally and internationally, pertaining to 
strike violence. 
 
4  Rationale for the study  
 
Strike violence is not conducive to any economy with growth ambition. There is evidence of 
flagrant lawlessness during these strikes which undermines the rule of law and must be stopped 
lest we fall into a state of anarchy.15 The role that the legislature and the courts can play in 
curbing the violence is investigated. For instance, the courts are often reluctant to intrude in 
industrial action matters so as to give effect to the constitutional right to strike.16 It is often 
difficult to identify the perpetrators of the violence during strike action and trade unions are 
happy to absolve themselves of any responsibility for any damages flowing from violence.  
                                                          
14 Ibid para 58. 
15 See Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA Workers Union & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 998 
(LC). 
16SB Gericke (see note 7: 580). See also Jumbo Products v NUMSA (1996) 17 ILJ 859 (W) 878. 
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This dissertation will nonetheless critically analyse union liability regulation as per common 
law, the LRA, the Regulation of Gatherings Act17 (hereafter ‘the RGA’) and recent court 
decisions.  
 
5 Statement of the problem 
 
It has been noted that recently strikers commit various unlawful acts during strikes with none 
being held liable for such conduct. Victims are always on the losing side as it is difficult to 
identify real perpetrators of the unlawful acts during strikes. The question that arises is: who 
should take the blame under such circumstances? The law is not clear in this regard, in 
particular, where industrial action is protected. The study investigates the liability for damage 
caused during strikes. The dissertation will thus deliberate on the liability (if any) of trade 
unions and the strikers, for straying outside the confines of the Constitution and the LRA by 
causing damage to others. 
 
6 Purpose of the study  
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the liability for violent conduct committed during a 
strike or industrial action. The study further investigates whether unions can be held liable for 
the violence caused by its members. The outcomes of the study will help union organisers and 
workers better understand the consequences that violent conduct will attract. The study will at 
instances explore other areas of law beyond labour law in search of solutions to the menace of 
violence. One such example will be the RGA. The specific objectives of the study can be 
broken down into the research questions. 
 
7 Research questions 
 
This dissertation will seek to answer two main questions, each with its own sub-questions:  
 
1. What are the causes of violence during strikes: 
a. Are there deficiencies in the bargaining framework?  
b. Is it the absence of a ballot requirement prior to a strike? 
                                                          
17 Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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c. Is it the negative effects of structural violence coupled with the majoritarian 
principle? 
 
2. Trade unions’ liability for damages caused during strike action: 
a. Can unions be held liable in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995? 
b. Can a trade union be held vicariously liable for the delicts committed by its 
members during a strike? 
c. Can trade unions be held liable in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 
of 1993? 
 
8 Literature review 
 
The right to strike is available to trade unions when there is a dispute of interest18 with an 
employer and negotiations have reached a stalemate. The strikers must comply with the 
procedural requirements for a lawful strike in terms of s 64 of the Labour Relations Act (‘the 
LRA’).19 In VNR Steel (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA,20 it was stated that  
 
‘by withholding their labour, the employees hope to bring production to a halt, causing 
him (the employer) to lose business and to sustain overhead expenses without the 
prospect of income, in the expectation, that should the losses be sufficiently substantial, 
the employer will accede to their demands.’  
 
Section 5 of the LRA protects employees against victimisation and discrimination for 
exercising their LRA rights to collectively bargain. These include trade union membership and 
activity, and their dismissal for performing their mandate as trade union representatives is a 
direct violation of fair labour practices.21 Employees are further protected from delictual and/or 
contractual claims for participation in a protected strike.22 An employer is thus prohibited from 
                                                          
18 Disputes of interest are contrasted with disputes of rights. Workers can only strike over disputes of interests 
and must refer matters where disputes of rights are concerned to arbitration. See for instance Rochelle le Roux 
‘Benefits: Have we found the way out of the labyrinth?’ (2015) 36 ILJ 888. 
19 S Vettori ‘The Labour Relations Act and the Protection of Trade Unions’ (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 304.  
20 VNR Steel (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (1995) 16 ILJ 1483 (LAC). 
21 T Cohen et al. Trade Unions and the Law in South Africa (2009), 4. 
22 S 67(2)(a)–(b) of the LRA. 
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dismissing an employee participating in a lawful strike or for any lawful conduct in the 
furtherance thereof.23 
 
Employers and employees may engage in Collective bargaining by virtue of Section 23(5) of 
the Constitution. Similarly, s 67 of the LRA immunises organising trade union or the striking 
employees against civil claims. This operates in conjunction with s 77 of the LRA which 
proscribes civil litigation against any union official for their participation in a protest action. 
The same protection applies to any lawful conduct that advances the objectives of a protected 
strike action. In Premier Foods Ltd t/a Ribbon Salt River,24 the court held:  
 
‘It is certainly not acceptable to force an employer through violent and criminal 
conduct to accede to their demands. This type of vigilante conduct not only seriously 
undermines the fundamental values of our Constitution, but only serves to seriously and 
irreparably undermine future relations between strikers and their employer. Such 
conduct further completely negates the rights of non-strikers to continue working, to 
dignity, to safety and security and privacy and peace of mind.’25 
 
At the centre of this dissertation is the discussion around such violence and the legal framework 
that firstly, seeks to prevent the violence, and secondly, understand how legal liability is 
attached under such circumstances. Le Roux points out that at common-law the employer may 
institute delictual claims against a trade union and/or strikers for damages arising from a 
strike.26 Rycroft points out that there is no provision in the LRA that provides for the revocation 
of a strike’s protected status in the event of violence.27 He postulates the view that a strike will 
lose its protected status on the bases that the violence becomes an end in itself and thus serves 
                                                          
23 S 67(4) of the LRA (see note 2). See also SB Gericke (see note 7) and AA Landman ‘No Place to Hide – a Trade 
Union's Liability for Riot Damage: A Note on Garvis & Others v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (Minister for 
Safety & Security, Third Party) (2010) 31 ILJ (WCC) 2521’ (2011) 32 ILJ 834–46. 
24 FAWU obo Kapesi & Others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Ribbon Salt River (2010) 31 ILJ 1654 (LC) 4, 6. 
25 Ibid at 6. 
26 PAK le Roux ‘Claims for compensation arising from strikes and lockouts’ (2013) 23(2) Contemporary Labour 
Law 11. 
27 A Rycroft ‘What Can Be Done about Strike-Related Violence?’ (2014) 30 IJCLLIR (International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations) (2)199, 7. See also Rycroft ‘Can a protected strike lose its 
status?’ (2012) ILJ 821. And Fergus ‘Reflections on the (Dys)functionality of strikes to collective bargaining: 
Recent Developments’ (2016) 37 ILJ 1537. And Grogan ‘Riotous strikes Unions liable to victims’ Employment Law 
Journal (October 2012) 11. And Wallis ‘Now You Foresee It, Now You Don't — SATAWU v Garvas & Others’ (2012) 
33 ILJ 2257.  
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no bargaining purposes.28 Rycroft relied on Tsogo Sun Casinos29 for authority for the view that 
the protected status of a strike may be revoked unlawful conduct, such as violence, is 
perpetrated. The ratio went as follows:  
 
‘A court will always intervene to protect both the right to strike, and the right to 
peaceful picketing. This is an integral part of the court’s mandate, conferred by the 
Constitution and the LRA. But the exercise of the right to strike is sullied and ultimately 
eclipsed when those who purport to exercise it engage in acts of gratuitous violence in 
order to achieve their ends. When the tyranny of the mob displaces the peaceful exercise 
of economic pressure as the means to the end of the resolution of a labour dispute, one 
must question whether a strike continues to serve its purpose and thus whether it 
continues to enjoy a protected status.’30  
 
Fergus questions whether a strike that then turns violent serves no bargaining purpose or only 
disrupts peaceful bargaining. The dissertation argues that the violence serves a bargaining 
purpose but the strike should nonetheless be declared unprotected on the grounds that the 
strikers seek to benefit from unlawful conduct. In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA31 the 
court held that, if the picket exceeds the bounds of peaceful persuasion or incitement to support 
the strike, to become coercive and disruptive of the business of third parties, the picket ceases 
to be reasonable and lawful.32 Employees thus open themselves to delictual and contractual 
liability, including dismissal for breach of contract, by partaking in such unlawful strikes. 
 
However, the protection that employees and trade unions enjoy does not extend to criminal acts 
committed during a strike by virtue of s 67(8) of the LRA as civil proceedings may be instituted 
against them for such criminal acts.33 There is thus no immunity granted for criminal conduct, 
but there are still practical problems in implementing s 67(8), particularly in relation to 
pinpointing the identity of the perpetrators, which is often troublesome. A case where a union 
                                                          
28 Rycroft ‘Can a protected strike lose its status?’ (2012) ILJ 821. 
29 Tsogo Sun Casinos (see note 15). 
30 Ibid at 13.  
31 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (2006) 27 ILJ 2681 (LC) 30. 
32 Ibid. 
33 SB Gericke (see note 7) 572. See also s 67(6) of the LRA. 
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was successfully sued for failing to persuade its members to cease their violent conduct is the 
In2FOOD (Pty) Ltd v FAWU34 matter where FAWU was handed a R500 000 fine. 
 
It is suggested that structural violence against employees is a significant contributor to the 
physical violence prevalent in strikes.35 The major contribution of this research will be in 
investigating how the principle of majoritarianism36 entrenched in the LRA is a form of 
legislated structural violence perpetrated against minority unions. This dissertation explores 
how the principle of Ubuntu can be utilised in interpreting the LRA provisions promulgating 
majoritarianism with the view of tailoring the principle of majoritarianism to the SA labour 
market. This will reduce the effects of structural violence and increase peace and collegiality 
in the workplace, thereby reducing strike violence. Writers like Kahn37 and Cohen38 advocate 
a revisiting of the majoritarian principle as it is inadequate, even antagonistic, towards the 
protection of minority interests. The views of the strikers and what drives them can be gleaned 
from the Farlam Commission Report.39 It will further be investigated how tools like balloting 
can be used to mitigate the negative effects of majoritarianism and whether this could reduce 
strike violence. This dissertation also investigates the use of interdicts to curb strike violence 
and suggests a reform that will promote the respect for the courts and the rule of law, reducing 
incidents of contempt of court and strike violence. 
                                                          
34 In2Food (Pty) Ltd v FAWU, Madisha, RS and 470 Others (LC Case J350/13). See also SA Transport & Allied 
Workers Union & Another v Garvas (2012) 33 ILJ 1593 (CC). And Algoa Bus Co (Pty) Ltd v Transport Action Retail 
& General Workers Union & Others (2015) 36 ILJ 2292 (LC). Food & Allied Workers Union v In2Food (Pty) Ltd 
(2014) 35 ILJ 2767 (LAC).  
35 For a detailed discussion see Ngcukaitobi ‘Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills 
of Marikana’ (2013) 34 ILJ 836. See also Hartford ‘The mining industry strike wave: what are the causes and what 
are the solutions?’ (available at http://groundup.org.za/content/mining-industry-strike-wave-what-are-causes-
and-what-are-solutions). And Theron et al. ‘Organisational and collective bargaining rights through the lens of 
Marikana’ (2015) 36 ILJ 849. And Webster ‘The shifting boundaries of industrial relations: Insights from South 
Africa’ 2015 International Labour Review Vol 154(1) 27. And Brassey ‘Labour Law After Marikana: Is 
Institutionalized Collective Bargaining in SA Wilting? If So, Should We Be Glad or Sad?’ (2013) 34 ILJ 823. And Du 
Toit ‘The extension of Bargaining Council Agreements: Do the Amendments address the Constitutional 
Challenge’ (2014) 35 ILJ 2637.  
36 Discussed by the Constitutional Court at length in Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union & 
Others v Chamber of Mines of South Africa & Others [2017] ZACC 3 para 44. 
37 Kahn ‘A Chance to Reassess our System of Industrial Relations’ Business Day 1 October 2012, available at 
http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2012-10-01-a-chance-to-reassess-our-system-of-industrial-
relations/. 
38 Cohen ‘Limiting Organisational Rights of Minority Unions: POPCRU v Ledwaba [2013] 11 BLLR 1137 (LC)’ 
(2014) 17 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 60. And Theron ‘Decent Work and the Crisis of Labour Law in 
South Africa’ (2014) 35 ILJ 1829. N Coleman ‘Towards new collective bargaining, wage and social protection 
strategies in South Africa’ available at http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/misc/2013/ncoleman.pdf. 
39 The Marikana (Farlam) Commission Report available at http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/marikana-
report-1.pdf. 
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9  Structure of the research  
 
The study is made up of six chapters. These chapters are interrelated yet distinctive to give the 
reader a complete picture of applicable law. It attempts to address burning issues of liability 
for violent strikes using legal remedies. After this introductory chapter (Chapter 1), the content 
of the dissertation will take the following direction: 
 
Chapter 2: Overview of the right to strike in SA 
Chapter 3: The causes of strike violence 
Chapter 4: The liability of trade unions and members for strike-related violence 
Chapter 5: Statutory remedies in terms of the LRA and the RGA  
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The right to strike is one of the fundamental rights available to workers in terms of the 
Constitution.40 The right to strike is a tool or weapon used during the collective bargaining 
process by employees against employers during heated labour disputes. It was given effect to 
in S 27(4) of the Interim Constitution41 which provided that ‘Workers shall have the right to 
strike for the purpose of collective bargaining’, and currently in S 23 of the Constitution and 
ss 64 and 65 of the LRA of 1995. In terms of labour legislation the right to strike and associated 
rights like the right to picket, are protected and immunised against civil and/or contractual 
liability that could be claimed by employers and third parties who suffer harm as a result of the 
strike. This chapter reminds the reader about the principles applicable to protected and 
unprotected strikes including consequences for each of these conducts. 
 
2 Collective bargaining 
 
a) Collective bargaining in South Africa 
 
The LRA does not define collective bargaining. In short, academics have defined it as a process 
of negotiation between employers or employer’s organisations and trade unions on the terms 
and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual interest with the purpose of reaching 
an agreement.42 The LRA aims to democratise the workplace by providing a framework for 
collective bargaining.43 In SAPU and Another v National Commissioner of the South African 
Police Service and Another,44 the court held that:  
 
‘The very purpose of collective bargaining is to bring equality to the relationship. 
Collective bargaining organises and distributes contractual power by means of the 
power play inherent in the process.’45 
                                                          
40 S 23 of the Constitution. 
41 Act 200 of 1993. 
42 J Grogran Workplace Law 10 ed (2009) 343. 
43 S 1(c)(i) & (d) of the LRA. 
44 [2006] 1 BLLR 42 (LC). 
45 Ibid para 53. 
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The LRA seeks to achieve this purpose by creating a framework in which trade unions, 
employers or employer’s organisations may negotiate terms and conditions or issues of mutual 
interest affecting them in the workplace. Unions are the primary vehicle through which the 
interests of the workers are expressed and negotiated. Unions are mandate driven organisations 
and can only act once mandated to do so. To capacitate unions to fulfil their duties, Chapter 3 
of the LRA bestows upon them organisational rights that assist unions to effectively bargain 
with the employer or employer’s organisation.  
 
The LRA makes a distinction between the majority union and the sufficiently representative 
union,46 with different rights available to each. The LRA does not prescribe what will constitute 
sufficiently representative but leaves it up to the employer and the majority trade union to make 
such a determination through a collective agreement.47 Majority unions are afforded more 
rights and powers than minority unions, such as the right to demand that the employer disclose 
information that will enable the union to bargain effectively,48 or the right to enter into 
collective agreements with the employer. Sufficiently representative unions will enjoy 
organisational rights contained in ss 12, 13 and 15 of the LRA. Several rights are associated 
with collective bargaining. This dissertation will confine itself to a detailed discussion of the 
right to strike. 
 
3 The right to strike 
 
As stated above, the right to strike is part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining. In 
Stuttafords Department Stores v SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union,49 the LAC held:  
 
‘The very reason why employees resort to strikes is to inflict economic harm on their 
employer so that the latter can accede to their demands. A strike is meant to subject an 
                                                          
46 S 11 of the LRA.  
In this Part, unless otherwise stated, ‘representative trade union’ means a registered trade union, or two or 
more registered trade unions acting jointly, that are sufficiently representative of the employees employed by 
an employer in a workplace. 
47 S 18(1) of the LRA. 
48 S 16 of the LRA. 
49 (2001) 22 ILJ 414 (LAC). 
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employer to such economic harm that he would consider that he would rather agree to 
the workers’ demands than have his [or her] business harmed further by the strike.’50 
 
It is used as a last resort by employees when employers fail to accede to their demands. As 
such it is regarded as a deadlock-breaking mechanism. The Constitution stipulates that ‘every 
worker has the right to strike’.51 Section 64(1) of the LRA stipulates that ‘Every employee has 
the right to strike …’. Although each individual employee has a constitutional right to strike, 
that right must be exercised collectively.52 
 
The Constitutional Court in South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Moloto53 
reaffirmed that the right to strike is enshrined in the Constitution with no express limitations.54 
This is in conformity with international law which recognises the right to strike as essential to 
the protection of workers’ rights and interests.55 
 
The Constitutional Court in South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Moloto56 
described the right to strike as a tool to redress the inequalities in the social and economic 
powers inherent in industrial relations.57 It held further that the right can be used to bolster 
other social and political rights in the Constitution, including freedom of association.58 In 
NUMSA v Bader Bop59 the right to strike was described as a ‘component of a successful 
collective bargaining system’.60 The court emphasised the importance of strikes for the 
protection of the workers’ dignity that they may not be treated as forced workers and it is only 
through strikes that employees can exercise bargaining power in industrial relations.61 
 
  
                                                          
50 Ibid at 422E–G. 
51 S 23(2)(C). 
52 See s 213 of the LRA. 
53 (2012) 33 ILJ 2549 (CC). 
54 Ibid para 43. 
55 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1996; The European Social Charter of 
1961. 
56 See note 52. 
57 Ibid para 44. 
58 Ibid. 
59 2003 (2) BCLR 182 (CC). 
60 Ibid at para 13. 
61 Ibid.   
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3.1 The right to strike in the LRA 
 
The LRA gives effect to most of the labour rights mentioned in the Constitution. It defines a 
strike as:  
 
‘The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of 
work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different 
employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect 
of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, and every reference 
to “work” in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or 
compulsory.’62 
 
By definition then, a strike only comes into existence when there is a concerted effort by 
employees to withdraw their labour with the objective of resolving a grievance in respect of a 
matter of mutual interest with the employer. As stated above, the LRA draws a distinction 
between protected (lawful) and unprotected (unlawful) strikes. We now turn our attention to 
what constitutes protected and unprotected strikes. 
 
3.2 Protected and unprotected strikes  
 
Protected strikes are those strikes that comply with certain procedural requirements63 and 
substantive requirements64 set out in the LRA, whilst an unprotected strike is one that is not in 
compliance with the LRA. 
 
Under the common law of contract, employees who withdrew their labour were said to be in 
breach of their contract of employment.65 Employers were then at liberty to terminate such 
contract(s) on the basis of the said breach and had the added option of suing the strikers and 
organisers of the strikes for damages emanating from the breach of contract.66 However, the 
introduction of the LRA changed the common-law position.  
                                                          
62 S 213 of the LRA. 
63 S 64 of the LRA. 
64 S 65 of the LRA. S 65(2)(b) of the Labour Relation Act No. 28 of 1956 had the added requirement of a secret 
ballot. See chapter 3 below. 
65 Grogan note 41 at 183. 
66 Ibid. 
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3.2.1 Consequences of a protected strike 
 
The introduction of the LRA changed the common-law position. The significance of a 
protected strike is that strikers and strike organisers are afforded protection against dismissal 
and/or civil liability.67 The dismissal of a striker for partaking, or for expressing an intention to 
partake, in a protected strike is automatically unfair.68 See Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion. 
 
3.2.2 Consequences of an unprotected strike 
 
Unprotected strikes do not enjoy the protection associated with protected strikes. The strikers 
in an unprotected strike are as vulnerable as strikers at common law.69 The employer can claim 
damages70 and the Labour Court can interdict the strike.71 The courts have found dismissal of 
strikers who participate in unprotected strikes to be fair.72 See Chapter 5 for an in-depth 
discussion. 
 
 3.3 Limitation on the right to strike 
 
The right to strike is not only subject to the general limitation clause contained in s 36 of the 
Constitution,73 it is also subject to procedural limitations set out in s 64 of the LRA, and 
substantive limitation as per s 65 of the LRA. The Constitutional Court in Transport and Allied 
Workers Union of South Africa v PUTCO Limited,74 clarified s 64(1) of the LRA as follows:  
 
                                                          
67 S 67(6) of the LRA provides protection against civil liability. See Afrox Ltd v SA Chemical Workers Union & others 
(2) (1997) 18 ILJ 406 (LC) 410D–F. 
68 S 187(1)(a) of the LRA. 
69 In terms of s 187(1)(a), a dismissal is automatically unfair if: 
‘… if the reason for the dismissal is— (a) that the employee participated in or supported, or indicated an 
intention to participate in or support, a strike or protest action that complies with the provisions of Chapter 
IV.’ 
70 S 68(1)(b) of the LRA. 
71 S 68(1)(a) of the LRA. 
72 See Transport & Allied Workers Union of SA & Others v Unitrans Fuel & Chemical (Pty) Ltd (2013) 34 ILJ 1785 
(LC) and Mndebele & Others v Xstrata SA (Pty) Ltd t/a Xstrata Alloys (Rustenburg Plant). 
73 The ‘limitations clause’. See note 8.   
74 Transport and Allied Workers Union of South Africa v PUTCO Limited (CCT94/15) [2016] ZACC 7; (2016) 37 ILJ 
1091 (CC); [2016] 6 BLLR 537 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 39 (CC); 2016 (7) BCLR 858 (CC) (8 March 2016). 
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‘The dictates of section 64(1)(a) are clear. No industrial action can be undertaken until 
there has been an attempt at conciliation. This provision also makes pertinent that an 
“issue in dispute” arises prior to a matter being referred for conciliation. Only once a 
dispute has arisen can it be referred to a bargaining council for conciliation. Moreover, 
industrial action can only be taken in the event that an attempt at conciliation fails, 
either because a certificate by the bargaining council states that the issue in dispute 
remains unresolved, or because a period of 30 days, or any extension of that period 
agreed to between the parties to the dispute, has elapsed since the referral was received 
by the bargaining council. Referral to conciliation is not merely a perfunctory 
procedural step that has to be complied with in order to obtain a licence to lock out or 
to embark on a strike. The object of section 64(1)(a) is to bring together the parties at 
the negotiations, and encourage them to seek solutions to issues of mutual concern, 




‘This Court has previously recognised that the right to “collective bargaining between 
the employer and . . . [employees] is key to a fair industrial relations environment”. The 
LRA is concerned with the power imbalance between the employer and employees. It 
sanctions the use of power by employers and employees, but only as a last resort, and 
only after the issue in dispute between the parties has been referred for conciliation. 
Collective bargaining therefore implies that each employer-party and employee-party 
has the right to exercise economic power against the other once the issue in dispute has 
been referred for conciliation, and only if that process fails in one of the manners 
described above.’76 (Authorities omitted.) 
 
The LRA requires that the dispute be referred for conciliation and, if that fails, the employer 




                                                          
75 Ibid at para 45. 
76 Ibid at para 46. 
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a) Referral of the dispute to conciliation 
 
This requirement entails that a strike must be preceded by a process of negotiation between the 
employer and employees.77 If such negotiations do not yield a resolution, the dispute must then 
be referred to a bargaining or statutory council with jurisdiction.78 If there is no bargaining or 
statutory council with jurisdiction the matter must be referred to the CCMA.79 The council or 
the CCMA is mandated to attempt to resolve the matter through conciliation80 and within a 
period of 30 days or issue a certificate of non-resolution which may be before the expiry of the 
30-day period.81 In the event of conciliation not bearing the desired results, the workers may 
proceed to the next stage once the council or the CCMA has either issued a certificate of non-
resolution or the 30-day period has lapsed.82 In Betafence South Africa (Pty) Ltd v National 
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others83 the court held:  
 
‘The CCMA or Bargaining Councils were not meant to be mere vending machines 
expected to dispense of certificates of outcome on demand. The parties prior to 
embarking on any form of industrial action, must have through the assistance of 
conciliators/mediators, embarked on a genuine process of conciliation, or at the very 
least, made some concerted effort in that regard.84 To the extent that the other party to 
the dispute may show scant regard to that process by either frustrating it or refusing to 
participate in it at all, the provisions of section 64 (1) (a) (ii) would then take effect.’85 
  
                                                          
77 County Fair Foods v Oil Chemical General and Allied Workers Union & Others (2000) ZALC 40 (LC) 4. 
78 Ibid. 
79 S 64(1)(a) of the LRA. 
80 S 115(1)(a) of the LRA. 
81 Road Accident Fund v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 2168 (LC) 2176A–B. 
82 See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality & Another v SAMWU & Others (Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality) [2011] 7 BLLR 663 (LC) para 15.  
83 (C194/2016) [2016] ZALCCT 33 (15 September 2016). 
84 See also City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SAMWU J2236/07. 
85 Betafence note 83 at para 19. 
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b) The notice of intention to strike 
 
The workers must give the employer, or the employers’ organisation, at least forty-eight (48) 
hours’ written notice of the commencement of the strike.86 A seven-day notice is however 
applicable where the employer is the State.87 The LRA does not specify what information the 
notice should contain; our courts have however provided guidance in that regard. The notice 
should set out the subject-matter of the strike, that is, the strikers’ demands.88 The strike notice 
must be specific of the day the strike will take place.89 Generally, the notice need not specify 
the time of day the strike will take place,90 however, depending on the nature of the business, 
for instance one where staff work in shifts, then the time of day will have to be specified in the 
notice.91  
 
The purpose of serving the employer or employers’ organisation with a reasonable notice is to 
give them sufficient or adequate time to prepare for the impending strike. Such preparations 
may include the hiring of replacement labour to mitigate against the loss of productivity.92 The 
LAC in Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitary Ware and Another v NCBAWU and Others93 
pointed out two reasons why this notice has to be issued: 
 
‘to enable the employer to decide whether to prevent the strike by giving into the union’s 
demands; and to enable the employer to take steps to protect the business when the 
strike started.’94 
                                                          
86 S 64 (1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.   
87 S 64(1)(d) of the LRA. 
88 Betafence note 83 at para 25. See also Construction & Allied Workers Union & Others v Modern Concrete Works 
[1999] 10 BLLR 1020 (LC) 1023D. Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Better Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building 
and Allied Workers Union (1997) 18 ILJ 671 (LAC); SA Airways (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU [2010] 3 BLLR 321 (LC) paras 
26–7, and Metsimaholo Local Municipality v South African Municipal Workers Union (JA123/2014) [2016] ZALAC 
19. 
89 Ceramic Industries note 87 at 676g–i. See also Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Professional Transport 
Workers Union & others (1) (1998) 20 ILJ 260 (LAC) at 267g. 
90 County Fair Foods (A Division of Astral Operations Ltd) v Hotel, Liquor, Catering, Commercial & Allied Workers 
Union & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 348 (LC) at 361A. See also Construction & Allied Workers Union & Others v Modern 
Concrete Works [1999] 10 BLLR 1020 (LC) at 1023D. 
91 Ceramic Industries t/a Betta Sanitary Ware v National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union (1997) 18 
ILJ 671 (LAC) at 677a–b. 
92 S 76(1) of the LRA. 
93 Note 91. 
94 Ibid at 676d–f. See also SAA (Pty) Ltd v SATAWU (2010) Note 87 at 1227j–1228a; and Imperial Group (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Imperial Cargo Solutions v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union & Others (1) (2014) 35 ILJ 3154 (LC) at 3160e–
f. 
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In Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v South African Transport and Allied Workers Union,95 
the LAC held that employees who wish to join a sanctioned strike must also issue their own 
notice otherwise their participation will be unlawful. In SATAWU v MOLOTO, the 
Constitutional Court overruled the LAC when it held that s 64 does not require more than one 
notice in relation to the single strike.96  
 
In SATAWU v Moloto,97 SATAWU issued a notice to commence a strike and once the strike 
had commenced, some SATAWU non-members joined SATAWU members by participating 
in that strike. The employer dismissed the non-members for unauthorised absence from work 
based on the failure to provide notice of intention to strike. On the particular facts of Moloto, 
the Constitutional Court held that ‘SATAWU was recognised as a bargaining agent for all the 
employees of the employer…’, irrespective of whether or not they were unionised.98 The court 
thus found that SATAWU represented its members as well as the non-unionised employees 
and, as such, the notice to strike in effect encapsulated the non-unionised members and the 
employer was thus adequately notified.99  
 
It appears that the position in Equity Aviation, being that all employees intending to strike must 
issue a notice that covers them, represents the current legal status. The Constitutional Court in 
Moloto did not overturn this decision, it merely decided that on the facts of the particular case 
that the one notice was wide enough to cover all the employees who went on strike. 
  
                                                          
95 ([2009] 10 BLLR 933 (LAC); (2009) 30 ILJ 1997 (LAC)) [2009] ZALAC 35; [2009] ZALAC 3 (14 May 2009). 
96 Note 53 at para 64. 
97 Note 53.   
98 Ibid at 2568c. 
99 Ibid at 2578f. 
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c) Exceptions to s 64 requirements (Alternative procedures) 
 
The requirements set out above do not always have to be complied with. The LRA makes 
provision for alternative means in the following instances where the above requirements do not 
have to be adhered to: 
 
i) Where the parties to the dispute are members of a bargaining council and the dispute 
has been dealt with by that bargaining council in accordance with its constitution;100 
 
ii) Where the strike or lock-out is in line with the procedures in a collective 
agreement;101 
 
iii) Where the employees strike in response to a lock-out (by their employer) that does 
not comply with the provisions of Chapter 4 of the LRA;102 
 
iv) Where the employer is not compliant with ss 64(4)103 and 64(5).104 That is, where 
the employer has unilaterally altered the terms and conditions of employment and 
fails to remedy the situation within 48 hours, then the employees can embark on a 
strike without complying with the requirements set out above. 
 
In addition to the s 64 limitations, the LRA sets s 65 limitations which may be characterised as 
substantive limitations as they set limits on issues that form the substratum of the grievance 
that is the subject of the strike. The limitations are set on: the issues that permit employees to 
                                                          
100 S 64(3)(a) of the LRA.   
101 S 64(3)(b) of the LRA. 
102 S 64(3)(c) of the LRA.   
103 S 64(4) provides that: 
‘Any employee who or any trade union that refers a dispute about a unilateral change to terms and conditions 
of employment to a council or the Commission in terms of subsection (1)(a) may, in the referral, and for the 
period referred to in subsection (1)(a): 
(a) require the employer not to implement unilaterally the change to terms and conditions of employment; 
or 
(b) if the employer has already implemented the change unilaterally, require the employer to restore the 
terms and conditions of employment that applied before the change.’  
104 S 64(5) provides that: 
‘The employer must comply with a requirement in terms of subsection (4) within 48 hours of service of the 
referral on the employer.’ 
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embark on a protected strike; and the types of employees who may embark on a strike. It will 
not suffice to comply only with s 64 for a strike to be protected, s 65 must also be complied 
with.105 
 
d) A collective agreement prohibiting a strike on the issue in dispute 
 
For a collective agreement to have any bearing on the parties to a dispute, it must have been in 
existence and in force at the time of the strike and must have regulated the issue in dispute.106 
 
In Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Communication Workers Union,107 the union referred a dispute to the 
CCMA for conciliation. The CCMA issued a certificate of non-resolution. It was clear from 
the presentation of the parties that there was a collective agreement in place that prohibited the 
parties from embarking on a strike. The union nevertheless proceeded to strike. The court held 
that the LRA limited the right to strike if s 65 was not adhered to, notwithstanding compliance 
with s 64.108 The court held further that the limitations of s 65 cannot be undermined with a 
certificate of outcome.109 
 
The collective agreement must be drafted in such a way that it reflects the true intentions of the 
parties and avoids ambiguity. In BMW SA (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
on behalf of Members,110 there was a dispute on whether or not the National Bargaining Forum 
covered the issue of payment of a transport allowance to hourly paid employees.111 The court 
found that there was no agreement to that effect and, therefore, there was nothing prohibiting 
a strike as the collective agreement did not regulate the issue at hand, being transport 
allowances for employees paid on an hourly rate.112 
 
In Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v FAWU and Others,113 the company had farming and processing 
divisions. The workers from the processing plant sought a wage increase and embarked on a 
                                                          
105 Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Communication Workers Union (2010) 31 ILJ 2060 (LAC) para 10. 
106 National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Highveld Steel & Vanadium (2002) 23 ILJ 895 (LAC) at 901b. 
107 Note 105 
108 Ibid at 2063j–2064a. 
109 Ibid at 2064b. 
110 (2012) 33 ILJ 140 (LAC). 
111 Ibid at 152a. 
112 Ibid at 146e–f. 
113 (2004) 25 ILJ 2135 (LAC).   
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strike. Their colleagues in the farming division joined the strike with the view of obtaining a 
wage increase for themselves. The LAC held that the workers from the farming division were 
bound by a collective agreement and thus were not entitled to strike over wage demands on 
their own behalf.114  
 
It may become necessary to determine the actual issue in dispute in order to determine whether 
it is a dispute which the employees may strike on. In Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta 
Sanitaryware v National Construction Building and Allied Workers Union and Others115 the 
Labour Appeal Court emphasised this point by stating:  
 
’… The refusal of a demand, or the failure to remedy a grievance, always needs to be 
examined in order to ascertain the real dispute underlying the demand or remedy. The 
demand or remedy will always be sought to rectify the real, underlying, dispute. It is 
the nature of that dispute that determines whether a strike in relation to it is permissible 
or not …’116 
 
In short, workers will not be allowed to strike if the matter in dispute is regulated by a collective 
agreement that is still in force.  
 
e) An agreement that requires the issue in dispute to be referred to arbitration 
 
Section 65(1)(c) of the LRA permits parties to enter into an agreement as to which issues they 
choose to refer to arbitration and once such agreement is entered into, parties will be bound 
according to the tenor of their agreement. There is no express limit on the issues that the parties 
can agree on and it has been submitted that such matters include those regarded as ‘disputes of 
interest’.117 
 
Other instances where striking is prohibited is when the dispute relates to allegations of unfair 
dismissal, automatically unfair dismissals, unfair labour practices, victimisation, the 
interpretation and application of a collective agreement, picketing, agency and closed shop 
                                                          
114 Ibid. 
115 Note 91. 
116 At 703F–H 
117 J Grogan Collective Labour Law (2007) at 149. 
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agreements, and admission or expulsion from a bargaining council.118 These are disputes of 
rights and should be referred for adjudication.119 
 
f) The issue in dispute is one that the party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the 
Labour Court 
 
The issue here turns on the differentiation of disputes of rights and disputes of interest, where 
the former must be referred to arbitration and the latter may be resolved through a strike.120 A 
dispute of right is where the existence of a right is in dispute whereas disputes of interest are 
concerned with creating new rights through collective bargaining.121 
 
g) Essential services (type of employee) 
 
According to s 65(1)(d)(i) of the LRA, employees who provide essential services are prohibited 
from striking. The LRA defines an essential service as: 
 
‘a service the interruption of which endangers the life, personal safety or health of the 




‘The Parliamentary service and the South African Police Service are deemed to have been 
designated an essential service in terms of this section.’123 
 
In SAPS v POPCRU and Others, the court held that not all employees of the SAPS are 
prohibited from striking since only a portion of the SAPS workforce actually provides essential 
services.124  
                                                          
118 T Cohen, A Rycroft & B Whitcher Trade Unions and the Law in South Africa (2009) 47 at 57.  
119 Ibid. 
120 S 65(1)(C). See also Mawethu Civils (Pty) Ltd & Another v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (2013) 34 
ILJ 2624 (LC). 
121 PAK le Roux ‘Defining the Limits of the Right to Strike’ (2004) 13 CLL 91 at 95. 
122 S 213 of the LRA. 
123 S 71(10) of the LRA. 
124 (2011) 32 ILJ 1603 (CC). 
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h) Maintenance services 
According to s 75(1) of the LRA, a service constitutes a maintenance service if the interruption 
of that service has the effect of material physical destruction to any working area, plant or 
machinery. Employees who provide such service are restricted from striking.125 
 
Since employees providing essential services and maintenance services are prohibited from 
striking, their disputes are resolved through conciliation by a council with jurisdiction or the 
CCMA, and ultimately through compulsory arbitration.126 
 
i) Where an arbitration award, collective agreement, ministerial determination or 
BCEA determination regulates the issue in dispute 
 
Section 65(3) of the LRA prohibits a strike on an issue regulated by an arbitration award, 
collective agreement, ministerial determination or BCEA determination.127 An arbitration 
award has the legal force of a court order and non-compliance with it amounts to a contempt 
of court.128 As such, the award brings finality to the matter and there would thus be no valid 
reason to strike.129  
 
  
                                                          
125 S 65(1)(d)(ii). 
126 S 74 of the LRA. 
127 S 65(3) reads as follows: 
‘(3) Subject to a collective agreement, no person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in 
contemplation or furtherance of a strike or lock-out— 
(a) if that person is bound by— 
(i) any arbitration award or collective agreement that regulates the issue in dispute; or 
(ii) any determination made in terms of section 44 by the Minister that regulates the issue in dispute; 
or 
(b) any determination made in terms of the Wage Act and that regulates the issue in dispute, during the 
first year of that determination.’ 
128 S 141(6) read with s 142(8) of the LRA.  
129 Grogan Collective Labour Law note 42 at 159. 
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4  Conclusion 
 
Strikes are a powerful tool for enforcing workers’ rights in the workplace and also in redressing 
the inequalities in bargaining power in the workplace. The right to strike is entrenched 
s 23(2)(c) of the Constitution and is given effect by ss 64 and 65 of the LRA. Section 64 
provides the procedure for a protected strike while s 65 deals with the substantive issue, the 
subject-matter, of a strike. The effect is that the strike is either protected or unprotected and 
consequences will follow depending on that status. Civil liability will follow an unprotected 
strike, with possible dismissals and civil liability; strikers must adhere to these limitations. In 
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The trend in recent years has seen workers attempt to bolster and intensify their collective 
bargaining power by resorting to violence during strikes. This has a negative impact on those 
in the vicinity of the violence such as non-striking workers, as well as members of the 
community, and the economy in general.130 It is contended that the manifestation of physical 
violence during strikes is a direct result of structural violence.131 This chapter defines and 
analyses the broad concept of structural violence. The discussion will then investigate the role 
of narrower factors that may contribute to structural violence. These factors are 
majoritarianism, replacement labour, and the use of ballots before the commencement of a 
strike. It has been suggested that our collective bargaining laws have played a significant 
contributory role in the eruption of this violence.132  
 
This chapter critically analyses selected provisions of the LRA that deal with the principle of 
majoritarianism and argue that these provisions place insurmountable obstacles in the way of 
minority unions, thereby unjustifiably encroaching on their constitutionally entrenched 
rights.133 It further argues that the current interpretation and application of these provisions, 
including those relating to replacement labour, perpetuate structural violence by being 
antagonistic to the struggles of workers to emancipate themselves economically, thus creating 
conditions fertile for strike violence to occur. In addition, it is argued that the LRA 
inadvertently defeats its own objectives of promoting orderly collective bargaining.134 This can 
be corrected by acknowledging the structural violence committed against workers and then 
interpreting the LRA in a manner that eradicates structural violence. 
 
 
                                                          
130 See for instance M Tenza ‘An investigation into the causes of violent strikes in South Africa: Some lessons 
from foreign law and possible solutions’ Law, Democracy & Development Vol 19 (2015) 211. 
131 See for instance T Ngcukaitobi ‘Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills of 
Marikana’ (2013) 34 ILJ 836, 839–40.   
132 M Tenza Note 130 at 212. 
133 J Kruger & CI Tshoose ‘The impact of the Labour Relations Act on minority trade unions: A South African 
perspective.’ PER Vol 16 n.4 Potchefstroom April 2013. 
134 S 1 of the LRA. 
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2  Factors that cause violence during strikes 
 
2.1 Structural violence 
 
The most overt form of violence is physical violence, which includes damage to property, 
assault and intimidation. Violence is defined as ‘Behaviour involving physical force intended 
to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.’135 Snyman defines public violence as the  
 
‘unlawful and intentional commission, together with a number of people, of an act or 
acts which assume serious dimensions and which are intended forcibly to disturb the 
public peace and tranquillity or to invade the rights of others’.136  
 
This chapter is concerned with the more subtle but devastating form of violence, namely, 
structural violence. Professor Johan Galtung was the first to coin the phrase ‘structural 
violence’.137 The concept provides a useful framework for the understanding of how societal 
structures violate human rights ensuring that human needs are unattainable.138 Galtung asserts 
that structural violence entails that ‘… the violence is built into the structure and shows up as 
unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.’139 He defines it as:  
 
‘avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs or, to put it in more general terms, 
the impairment of human life, which lowers the actual degree to which someone is able 
to meet their needs below that which would otherwise be possible.’140  
 
He further states that ‘when the potential is higher than the actual [it] is by definition avoidable 
and when it is avoidable, then violence is present.’141 Ngcukaitobi expresses structural violence 
as ‘a form of violence where some social structure or social institution purportedly harms 
people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs.’142 In the collective bargaining 
                                                          
135 Available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/violence, accessed on 27 October 2017. 
136 CR Snyman Criminal Law 5 ed (2008) 321. 
137 Johan Galtung ‘Violence, Peace, Peace Research’ (1969) 6.3 Journal of Peace Research 167. 
138 Kathleen Ho ‘Structural Violence as a Human Rights Violation’ Essex Human Rights Review Vol 4 No. 2 
September 2007.  
139 Note 137 at 171. 
140 Galtung ‘Kulturelle Gewalt’ (1993) 43 Der Burger im Staat at 106. 
141 Note 137 at 169. 
142 T Ngcukaitobi Note 35 at 841.   
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context, this entails that if workers could achieve an objective by striking and they are denied 
that right to strike without alternative means of achieving that objective, they are being 
subjected to structural violence.  
 
The preamble of the Constitution reads: 
 
‘We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the 
supreme law of the Republic so as to —  
… Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person …’ 
 
Structural violence is thus the antithesis of what the Constitution seeks to achieve, being to 
‘… Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person …’.143 Being 
economically productive is probably the single most popular way of improving the quality of 
life of people and freeing their potential. The dictum of the Namibian Supreme Court in Africa 
Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of Namibia144 finds profound 
application in an argument regarding structural violence against workers. The court said: 
 
‘Labour is … the means through which human beings provide for themselves, their 
dependants and their communities; a way through which they interact with others and 
assert themselves as contributing members of society; an activity through which to 
foster spiritual wellbeing, to enhance their abilities and to fulfil their potential. All these 
elements must be brought into the equation of labour relationships if social justice and 
fairness are to be achieved at the workplace; if social security, stability and peace are 
to be maintained.’145 
 
Further, according to the International Labour Organisation (‘the ILO’) the concept of decent 
work ‘is based on the understanding that work is not only a source of income but more 
                                                          
143 Preamble of the Constitution. 
144 Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of Republic of Namibia & Others (SA 51/2008) [2009] NASC 
17; [2011] 1 BLLR 15 (NmS); (2011) 32 ILJ 205 (NmS). 
145 Ibid para 70. 
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importantly a source of personal dignity, family stability, peace in community, and economic 
growth that expands opportunities for productive jobs and employment.’146  
 
Indeed as the antithesis of the Constitution, structural violence, particularly in the labour arena, 
must be eradicated. Work is the means through which people build up and protect their dignity 
and sense of worth. It is a mechanism through which one can raise one's self from a life 
circumstance that they aspire to grow out of and build a better quality of life. The right to strike 
is one of the drivers of such change and self-improvement.  
 
In the year 2012, the country witnessed what started out as a labour strike over better wages 
and living conditions by Lonmin miners, degenerate into brutal killings of miners and police 
alike. The police fatally shot 34 miners and 78 others were injured.147 Leading up to the strike, 
the miners had been heavily exploited. Their shifts last some 9 to 15 hours a day, 12 months a 
year with a break only on Easter and Christmas day.148 Even after long service, 25 to 35 years, 
prospects of promotion are very slim for most of the miners and earnings remain low.149 It has 
been said that the cause of the violence is the earning disparity between the miners and 
management.150 So, clearly miners were striking for better conditions, for a better life. 
 
As the Constitution seeks to ‘… Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential 
of each person …’,151 it follows then that any influential factor on the working conditions of 
our citizens must help workers achieve a better quality of life and realise their potential. 
Everything else must be stigmatised as structural violence if the result is that the workers’ 
ability to fully realise their potential at the workplace is obstructed. The question that arises is 
whether the legal framework regulating strikes and associated violence is aligned with the 
constitutional vision to ‘… Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of 




                                                          
146 ILO 2010 www.ilo.org. 
147 T Ngcukaitobi Note 35 at 837.   
148 G Hartford Note 35.   
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This section contextualises the concept of majoritarianism and demonstrates how, in its current 
form, it constitutes a powerful weapon utilised in a constitutionally repugnant manner by the 
orchestrators of structural violence against the vulnerable minority unions and their members, 
resulting in the dearth of justice, fairness, stability and peace for the workers. 
 
The LAC in Kem-Lin152 described majoritarianism as follows:  
 
‘… One policy choice is that the will of the majority should prevail over that of the 
minority. This is good for orderly collective bargaining as well as for the 
democratisation of the workplace and sectors. A situation where the minority dictates 
to the majority is, quite obviously, untenable. But also a proliferation of trade unions 
in one workplace or in a sector should be discouraged. There are various provisions in 
the Act which support the legislative policy choice of majoritarianism.’153 
 
Majoritarianism envisages a democratic environment where the will of the majority trumps that 
of the minority. However, an important facet of majoritarianism is how the minority is 
protected. Pluralism and diversity must be respected in a democracy; they are, however, 
severely stifled through a cynical and simplistic application of majoritarianism.154 Mogoeng CJ 
in Oriani-Ambrosini, MP v Sisulu, MP Speaker of the National Assembly 155 quoted with 
approval Sachs J’s dictum in Masondo: 
 
‘[T]he Constitution does not envisage a mathematical form of democracy, where the 
winner takes all until the next vote-counting exercise occurs. Rather, it contemplates a 
pluralistic democracy where continuous respect is given to the rights of all to be heard 
and have their views considered. ... It should be underlined that the responsibility for 
serious and meaningful deliberation and decision-making rests not only on the 
majority, but on minority groups as well. In the end, the endeavours of both majority 
and minority parties should be directed not towards exercising (or blocking the 
                                                          
152 [2000] ZALAC 25; (2001) 22 ILJ 109 (LAC); [2001] JOL 7711 (LAC).   
153 Ibid para 19. See also Transport and Allied Workers Union of South Africa v Putco Ltd Note 73 at para 52.   
154 J Kruger & CI Tshoose Note 132 
155 (CCT16/12) [2012] ZACC 27; 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC); 2013 (1) BCLR 14 (CC) (9 October 2012). 
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exercise) of power for its own sake, but at achieving a just society where, in the words 
of the Preamble, “South Africa belongs to all who live in it ...”’156 
 
Majoritarianism is a recurring theme in the LRA evidenced in ss 18, 23 and 65, read with ss 1 
and 213. Section 23(1)(d)157 permits majority unions to enter into collective agreements with 
employers which, inter alia, prohibit strike action on issues of their choosing. The parties to 
this collective agreement are permitted to bind whoever they want to extend it to in the 
workplace, provided that; (a) everyone bound is identified in the agreement; (b) the agreement 
expressly binds them; and (c) the trade unions party to the agreement ‘have as their members 
the majority of employees employed by the employer in the workplace.’ In Sasol Mining (Pty) 
Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others158  the Court held: 
 
‘Section 23(1)(d)(ii) is clear. It requires the agreement expressly to bind employees 
who are not members of any trade union or members of the trade union not party to the 
agreement. This principle was confirmed by the Labour Appeal Court in Concor 
Projects (Pty) Ltd t/a Concor Opencast Mining v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation & Arbitration & others when it held that reliance on s 23(1)(d) was 
misplaced where the agreement does not state that it binds employees who are not 
members of the trade unions that are signatories to the agreement.’159 
 
In effect, the majority union negotiates on behalf of everyone at the workplace, including rival 
unions, whom they are in fierce competition with. It can further negotiate with the employer to 
set thresholds of representation as per s 18.160 What constitutes the majority union, in addition 
                                                          
156 Ibid. 
157 S 23(1)(d) provides:  
‘A collective agreement binds—  
..  
(d) employees who are not members of the registered trade union or trade unions party to the agreement 
if—  
(i) the employees are identified in the agreement;  
(ii) the agreement expressly binds the employees; and  
(iii) that trade union or those trade unions have as their members the majority of employees 
employed by the employer in the workplace.’   
158 (2017) 38 ILJ 969 (LC). 
159 Ibid at para 47. 
160 ‘s 18. Right to establish thresholds of representativeness 
(1) An employer and a registered trade union whose members are a majority of the employees employed by 
that employer in a workplace, or the parties to a bargaining council, may conclude a collective agreement 
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to holding a 50% plus 1 of the membership of the employee at the workplace, will often depend 
on the interpretation of the definition of ‘workplace’ in s 213 of the LRA.161 The substance of 
the effect of these provisions is felt most harshly by the minority unions through the operation 
of s 65(1) and (3) of the LRA which prohibits the exercise of the right to strike.162 In the recent 
case of South African Airways (Soc) Ltd v South African Cabin Crew Association and Others163 
the cabin crew’s strike over higher meal allowances was declared unprotected because the issue 
was regulated by a collective agreement that was extended to the minority union via s 23(1)(d) 
of the LRA, which the minority had refused to sign.  
 
In so far as the LRA relies on a numbers game and ignores other fundamental factors that 
impact on the minorities’ rights to dignity, equality and freedom, it should be downcast as an 
instrument of oppression. The LRA permits the employer and the majority union to negotiate 
for rival factions at the workplace and curtails their right to strike on whatever issues the 
employer and majority union deem fit, whether or not their agreement is in the best interests of 
the minority. It is submitted that majoritarianism may be used as an implement of oppression 
in this regard by pushing the aspirations, needs and grievances of the minority into obscurity, 
which, by definition, amounts to structural violence. Take for instance where the minority vote 
                                                          
establishing a threshold of representativeness required in respect of one or more of the organisational rights 
referred to in sections 12, 13 and 15. 
(2) A collective agreement concluded in terms of subsection (1) is not binding unless the thresholds of 
representativeness in the collective agreement are applied equally to any registered trade union seeking any 
of the organisational rights referred to in that subsection.’ 
161 S 213 defines ‘workplace’ as:   
‘(c) in all other instances means the place or places where the employees of an employer work. If an employer 
carries on or conducts two or more operations that are independent of one another by reason of their size , 
function or organisation, the place or places where employees work in connection with each independent 
operation, constitutes the workplace for that operation’.  
162 S 65(1) provides:  
‘No person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike 
or a lock-out if—  
(a) that person is bound by a collective agreement that prohibits a strike or lock-out in respect of the issue 
in dispute.’  
S 65(3) provides:  
‘Subject to a collective agreement, no person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in 
contemplation or furtherance of a strike or lock-out—  
(a) if that person is bound by—  
(i) any arbitration award or collective agreement that regulates the issue in dispute; or  
(ii) any determination made in terms of section 44 by the Minister that regulates the issue in dispute; 
or  
(b) any determination made in terms of Chapter Eight of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and that 
regulates the issue in dispute, during the first year of that determination.’  
163 (J949/17) [2017] ZALCJHB 158 (10 May 2017) para 20. 
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against the use of violence during a strike. It should not be that, all in the name of 
majoritarianism, their views are silenced and they are forcibly subjected to violence they have 
expressly denounced. In S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg,164 the following was said:  
 
‘One of the functions of the Constitution is precisely to protect the fundamental rights 
of non-majoritarian groups, who might well be tiny in number and hold beliefs 
considered bizarre by the ordinary faithful. In constitutional terms, the quality of a 
belief cannot be dependent on the number of its adherents nor on how widespread or 
reduced the acceptance of its ideas might be, nor, in principle, should it matter how 
slight the intrusion … is.’165  
 
As an example of the effects of majoritarianism, we return to the Marikana Massacre. The 
miners at Marikana call their committee the ‘Amadoda’,166 a Xhosa word which means ‘men’. 
Ngcukaitobi167 highlights the significance behind the choice of this name. He says ‘its power 
lies in its symbolism of strength, power or fearlessness. This symbolism arises from the fact 
that the term is used to distinguish “boys” from “men” …’.168 The underlying message here is 
insightful. The Amadoda rightfully demand to be treated with dignity, respect and equality. It 
is a great insult to them to be told that they, or their views, do not matter simply by virtue of 
being the minority. It is a humiliating and demoralising treatment, almost dehumanising, for 
them to face the prospect of having to resign themselves to living in deplorable conditions and 
their pleas for better conditions and housing being ignored in the name of majoritarianism.169 
Faced with the choice to simply accept the status quo for the sake of majoritarianism and agree 
that nothing will be done whilst their children are left susceptible to contracting illnesses 
associated with mine spills,170 or show defiance to the laws that seek to silence them and 
embark on unlawful strikes, the workers at Marikana chose to refuse to be silenced amidst 
deplorable working and living condition and continued striking illegally. As Amadoda, they 
felt duty bound to fight to improve their lives, and when fighting does not take any legal form 
                                                          
164 [1997] ZACC 11; 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC); 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC). 
165 Ibid para 160. 
166 K Sosibo ‘Emboldened “Five Madoda” Issue Fresh Wage Demands’ Mail and Guardian 28 September 2012, 
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-28-00-emboldened-five-amadoda-issue-fresh-wage-demands. 
167 T Ngcukaitobi ‘Strike Law, Note 35 at 836.  
168 Ibid at 839. 
169 Majoritarianism is discussed in the next section below. 
170 The Bench Marks Foundation ‘Communities in the Platinum Minefields’ Policy Gap 6 August 2012 95 (Bench 
Marks Report), available at http://www.bench-marks.org.za. 
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because the LRA, in the name of majoritarianism, stacks the odds firmly against them in favour 
of the employer who colludes with majority unions and the police171 to suppress the minority, 
the fighting spills out into physical violence. Viewed in this light, the insistence of 
majoritarianism in its current form is untenable.  
 
In this regard, majoritarianism should be viewed as a conduit through which role players in the 
labour market use to grab the high-lying fruit with the intention of fulfilling their socio-
economic goals. Majoritarianism in South Africa, from the point of view of the minority, is 
analogous to a fish that leaps out of the river to grab the low-lying fruit. Its success takes 
nothing away from the fact that it is an inept climber. On the other hand, from the point of view 
of the majority union, it is an obese monkey sitting comfortably at the top of the fruit tree 
throwing objects at the already handicapped fish trying to jump higher to grab a share of the 
high-lying fruit. As such, majoritarianism is an implement of oppression as it arms the fat 
monkey with objects to throw at and keep the minority in the lower echelons from which they 
seek to liberate themselves. 
 
Majoritarianism is not, in itself, repugnant to the laws of the Republic. However, there is a 
desperate need to develop and tailor this principle to make it work in the South African labour 
environment.  
 
a) The pitfalls of majoritarianism in South Africa 
 
i) Employers and majority unions 
 
Collective bargaining is meant to address and remedy the power imbalances prevalent between 
employer and employee. Brassey correctly observes that power imbalances are heavily 
distorted in the employer’s favour, and crucially that ‘the worker as an individual has to accept 
the conditions which the employer offers’.172 This is in accordance with Klare’s assertions that 
                                                          
171 Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ssPrxvgePsc, accessed on 9 May 2017. The video 
demonstrates how Lonmin management collaborated with the SAPS to silence the strikers. 
172 Martin Brassey ‘Labour Law After Marikana: Is Institutionalized Collective Bargaining in SA Wilting? If So, 
Should We Be Glad or Sad?’ (2013) 34 ILJ 826. 
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the market, by reason of the intervention of the law, is a social construct in which capitalists 
are strongly favoured.173 Collective bargaining is meant to address these power imbalances. 
 
It is evident then that workers, as individuals, have very little bargaining power. It is only when 
individual workers band together and bargain collectively that they gather some bargaining 
power to counter-balance that of the employer. This is explained by Kahn-Freund, in Labour 
and the Law,174 who asserts that employers bargain from a position of strength. He explains 
that ‘the individual employee or worker ... has normally no social power because it is only in 
the most exceptional cases that, as an individual, he has any bargaining power at all’.175  
 
As a result of this inequality in collective bargaining, there is a likelihood that employers may 
collude with a majority union to exclude certain workers from the bargaining process, for 
instance through closed shop agreements,176 or through s 65 of the LRA which permits 
employers to enter into collective agreements that preclude identified unions and its members 
from striking on specific matters when certain conditions are met.177 The effect is that the 
employer and the majority union can enter into agreements with each other on certain issues 
that may not necessarily be in the best interest of the minority and then prohibit the minority 
from striking in pursuit of what is in their best interest. In this manner the employer can silence 
the minority unions whilst further alienating them from their colleagues. This alienation 
translates to an effective stifling of the minority’s aspirations. The matter is further exacerbated 
by the operation of s 18 of the LRA which allows the employer and majority unions to set 
inordinately high thresholds for representation. The message to workers not affiliated to the 
majority unions is that they should join the majority union, or suffer the humiliation of the 
constraints of a straitjacket and hannibal mask, thwarting any hopes of voicing and realising 
their aspirations. By creating rivalry and using majoritarianism, the employer can succeed, not 
only in alienating and thus weakening some factions of workers, but also in breeding a common 
                                                          
173 K Klare ‘The Public/Private Distinction in Labour Law’ (1982) 130 U Penn LR 1358 at 1370. 
174 O Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law 3 ed (1977). 
175 Ibid 5–7 
176 S 26 read with s 24 of the LRA. 
177 S 65 read: 
‘… 
(3) Subject to a collective agreement, no person may take part in a strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in 
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ground for infighting amongst workers, with the result that workers are competing with and 
fighting amongst themselves, when their true power lies in banding together and working for 
the common good. By hampering the minorities’ right to bargain collectively, in its current 
construct, majoritarianism perpetuates this injustice and therefore is an instrument for 
perpetuating structural violence as it deprives the minority of the ability to pursue what is in 
their best interests, and puts them at the mercy of their rival, being the very majority union that 
seeks to protect its own hegemony in the workplace.  
 
ii) Relationship between workers and unions 
 
Another factor that must be considered in assessing the appropriateness of majoritarianism in 
the workplace is the relationship between workers and unions as unions are essentially the 
mouthpiece for, and the vanguard of the workers’ aspirations. Brassey178 opines that this 
relationship has changed since the 1970s. He exclaims that unions fought laboriously for the 
rights of employees often at great personal sacrifice for the union officials, but union officials 
and stewards are currently handsomely rewarded and they are more interested in fighting for 
their personal luxuries, whilst union head office makes decisions on behalf of the members, 
and the bond between them has become tenuous.179 Brassey sums it up thus: 
 
‘Majoritarianism, the leitmotief of both industry bargaining and plant-level 
organizational rights, is too crude to give proper expression to the interests of minority 
unions, which frequently represent skilled or semi-skilled workers but, as the Marikana 
experience demonstrates, who may simply be acting on behalf of workers who feel 
alienated from the majority union.’180 
 
The above excerpt demonstrates that employees can very quickly find themselves in the 
minority when they are disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of the majority union in 
spearheading their cause, and realise that it no longer serves their interests to be part of the 
majority union. It further makes sense that the employers would staunchly support 
majoritarianism because, through the application thereof, the employer can act as the catalyst 
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in fostering complacency in majority unions by entering into agreements with it that effectively 
shield the majority union from competition from other unions vying for supremacy, and 
pampering the union official with luxuries in order to separate them from the sufferings of the 
workers, thereby reducing the zeal the officials once had for fighting for the workers. The 
workers who become disillusioned with the majority union should not lose the ability and 
protection afforded to protected strikers, to pursue their interests through collectively 
bargaining.  
 
The weapon of choice in this regard is s 18 of the LRA.181 The evidence is that s 18 is used by 
employers in cohorts with majority unions to set very high thresholds for representivity, 
thereby effectively excluding minority unions from the bargaining table.182 By virtue of s 18, 
the majority effectively knocks the teeth right out of the minority union’s mouth. This affects 
the workers’ freedom of association because no one will rely on a toothless dog to guard its 
interests. 
 
Placing shackles on minority unions and denying them the right to strike based on a numbers 
game fosters a deep sense of frustration and desperation. It turns workers into beasts.183 For 
instance, it cannot be justifiable, in an open and democratic society, to protect the hegemony 
of a trade union at the expense of silencing employees whose children are falling ill due to 
mine dump spills, particularly when such employees could effectively collectively bargain with 
the employer on the issue.184 The objective of controlling the proliferation of unions in the 
workplace cannot supersede or justify the gross violation of fundamental rights that workers 
suffer at the hands of those who will suppress them through structural violence. This scenery 
of structural violence brings to mind the old Russian adage that ‘even the bullet fears the brave’, 
                                                          
181 S 18. Right to establish thresholds of representativeness 
‘(1) An employer and a registered trade union whose members are a majority of the employees employed 
by that employer in a workplace, or the parties to a bargaining council, may conclude a collective agreement 
establishing a threshold of representativeness required in respect of one or more of the organisational rights 
referred to in sections 12, 13 and 15. 
(2) A collective agreement concluded in terms of subsection (1) is not binding unless the thresholds of 
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of the organisational rights referred to in that subsection.’ 
182 See also South African Post Office Ltd v Commissioner Nowosenetz [2013] 2 BLLR 216 (IC). In this case the 
union was denied organisational rights after the employer and majority union raised the threshold in a fresh 
agreement. This resulted in precluding the minority union from claiming rights acquired under the earlier 
agreements. 
183 T Ngcukaitobi Note 35 at 842. 
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where workers adopt the ‘come what may’ attitude when engaging in violence. In Pikitup 
Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd (‘Pikitup’) v South African Municipal Workers’ Union (‘SAMWU’) 
and Others185 the court referred to a press statement issued by SAMWU Head Office and 
appearing on the SAMWU website on 1 December 2015, under the heading ‘SAMWU to 
intensify Pikitup strike’, where the relevant excerpt reads:  
 
‘… We are very worried about the excessive force which we have seen being applied 
by the police on unarmed workers, workers who pose no threat to anyone. Surely the 
police have not learned from the mistakes they made in Marikana. We shall not be 
deterred by such acts of police brutality, in fact the police cannot take away workers’ 
constitutional right to embark on a strike action …’186 
 
The stance of the Union demonstrates how the State has become viewed as the enemy to the 
proletarian. The gruesome scenes of the State supressing workers is not a new phenomenon. It 
is appropriate to pause here and reflect on the structural violence that has historically been 
inflicted on workers in South Africa and the physical violence that flowed therefrom. 
Buitendag and Coetzer187 have observed that: 
 
‘Marikana was not the first time that executive power was used to intervene in 
industrial action. In 1914, the Union Government of South Africa employed the armed 
forces to bring a strike over attempts to retrench employees to an end. A few years later 
the infamous Rand Rebellion, which started as an industrial dispute, resulted in the 
deaths of some 230 people (mostly miners). The Great Strike of 1946 was organised by 
the African Mineworkers Union in response to the disparity in wages between white 
and black miners. The strike led to what became known as “Bloody Tuesday” when at 
least nine miners were gunned down by the police. In 1973 some 200 000 black workers 
engaged in a series of rolling strikes. While the strikes were largely peaceful, 12 strikers 
were killed and 38 injured by police at the Western Deep Levels Mine … The manner 
of dealing with industrial action by the Union Government in the early part of the 20th 
century and the National Party government thereafter serve as more suitable 
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comparators to the actions of the ANC in 2012. It is a pity that these events seem to 
have been forgotten or overlooked in the debate around Marikana.’188 
 
The physical violence seems to flow directly from the structural violence, more specifically in 
the form of majoritarianism which hampers workers from improving the quality of their lives 
and realising their potential. The Constitutional Court in AMCU v Chamber of Mines of South 
Africa and Others seems to have taken a different stance on majoritarianism. 
 
b) AMCU v Chamber of Mines of South Africa and Others 
 
The Constitutional Court in AMCU v Chamber of Mines of South Africa and Others189 recently 
considered the constitutionality of the majoritarianism principle. The court, as per Cameron J, 
explained the doctrine as both a premise of and recurring theme throughout the LRA.190 He 
noted that the provisions promulgating majoritarianism are not invulnerable to constitutional 
attack, but ‘it is only to point to them as piquantly instancing the scheme of the statute as a 
whole.’191 He also remarked that AMCU is correct that majoritarianism, as per s 23(1)(d) of 
the LRA limits the right to strike, but found that it was justified as it benefits orderly collective 
bargaining.192 Cameron J held that:  
 
‘What section 23(1)(d) does is to give enhanced power within a workplace, as defined, 
to a majority union: and it does so for powerful reasons that are functional to enhancing 
employees’ bargaining power through a single representative bargaining agent.’193  
 
Cameron J found that the enforcement of the majoritarian system allows minority unions 
freedom of association. He noted that AMCU enjoyed the rights, including organisational 
rights, under ss 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 27 and 28 of the LRA. The learned Judge then arrived at 
the conclusion that the LRA does not make majoritarianism an implement of oppression as it 
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does not entirely suppress minority unions.194 Ultimately, Cameron J concluded that ‘this 
means that the LRA, though premised on majoritarianism, does not make it an implement of 
oppression. It does not entirely suppress minority unions.’195 
 
Borrowing from the guard dog analogy, what Cameron J seems to be saying is that the dog’s 
teeth are not extracted. It should be noted that the usefulness of the rights enjoyed by a minority 
union in the workplace is severely hampered when divorced from the right to strike. This is 
because the minority’s ability to bite is neutralised by the breaking its jaw, full of bright white 
teeth which the employer can shun as incapable of inflicting harm. In this manner, minority 
unions are rendered impotent to actualise the aspirations of their members. The LAC in Black 
Allied Workers Union and Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel196 put it thus: 
 
‘The Act contemplates that the right to strike should trump concerns for the economic 
losses which the exercise of that right causes. That is because collective bargaining is 
necessarily a sham and a chimera if it is not bolstered and supported by the ultimate 
threat of the exercise of economic force by one or other of the parties, or indeed by 
both.’197  
 
Thus stripped of the threat to inflict economic harm, we see that the view ‘collective bargaining 
unaccompanied by the right to strike is little more than “collective begging”’,198 aptly 
demonstrates the degradation that minorities are forced to suffer, all in the name of 
majoritarianism.  
 
It should be noted further that through s 20 of the LRA,199 the majority union and the employer 
have an unfettered discretion to allow or disallow organisational rights through a collective 
agreement. As such, it is a weapon that can, and is, being used to oppress minority unions. 
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Further, having organisational rights divorced from the right to strike does not make for an 
effective union. The court in POPCRU v Ledwaba200 put it thus: 
 
‘Organisational rights must have a purpose and no such purpose can be achieved by 
affording organisational rights to a minority trade union where an employer and a 
majority trade union have already fully regulated all their affairs relating to their 
relationship, and the structure of collective bargaining, in a collective agreement made 
binding on all the employees in the employer. To simply afford organisational rights 
without a purpose or reason would make organisational rights an end in itself and not 
a means to an end, which is not what is intended by the LRA.’201 
 
Cameron J adopted a very narrow approach in assessing only the particular circumstances of 
AMCU without considering the broader implications of majoritarianism in SA. Indeed s 39(2) 
of the Bill of Rights mandates the judiciary, more so the Constitutional Court, to interpret and 
develop the law. The judiciary must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Cameron J missed an opportunity to assess majoritarianism, especially in light of the ample 
evidence that the principle of majoritarianism must be developed and brought in line with the 
spirit and purport of the Constitution in order to curb structural violence and the concomitant 
violations of fundamental rights, such as the rights to equality and dignity. 
 
Further, consistent with the narrow approach, Cameron J’s focuses his enquiry on whether or 
not there is a need for majoritarianism. This need is evident. The question is whether, in its 
current construct, majoritarianism is appropriate in the South African labour market? In so far 
as majoritarianism is antithetical to the legitimate aspirations of the workers that could be 
realised through strike action, and thwarting the constitutional aspiration to ‘… Improve the 
quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person …’, it is submitted that the 
answer is that our labour laws need an urgent overhaul to tailor majoritarianism to the South 
African labour market. The principle of majoritarianism should not be allowed to trump the 
fundamental right to strike, that is, to fight for one’s dignity and family aspirations and quality 
of life, particularly where poverty is concerned. It is the right to strike that allows the citizenry 
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of a country to ‘… Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person …’.202  
 
Further, Cameron J makes the important observation that majoritarianism, as a means of 
enhancing collective bargaining, is internationally recognised.203 It is submitted that the current 
implementation of majoritarianism renders it an implement of untenable oppression. In so far 
as the LRA does not provide for adequate checks and balances, majoritarianism is 
constitutionally objectionable. The ILO Collective Agreement Recommendation Cameron J 
refers to does not envisage a ‘one size fits all’ approach. It states that:  
 
‘Where appropriate, having regard to established collective bargaining practice, 
measures, to be determined by national laws or regulations and suited to the conditions 
of each country, should be taken to extend the application of all or certain stipulations 
of a collective agreement to all the employers and workers included within the 
industrial and territorial scope of the agreement.’ (Emphasis added.) 
 
Section 1(b) of the LRA states that the purpose of the LRA is to give effect to South Africa’s 
obligations as a member of the ILO.204 As the ILO envisages a tailoring of the national laws, 
had Cameron J considered this, he would have realised that the LRA, as required by the ILO, 
fails to provide for adequate measures to tailor majoritarianism to be autochthonous to the 
South Africa labour market. Majoritarianism, by silencing and marginalising the minority, also 
violates the LRA’s purposes of promoting employee participation in decision-making in the 
workplace205 and effective resolution of labour disputes.206 Issues raised by the minority cannot 
be effectively dealt with by refusing them an audience simply because they are the minority. 
Cohen says:207 
                                                          
202 Preamble to the Constitution. 
203 AMCU v Chamber of Mines Note 188 Para 56. The reference was to the ILO Collective Agreements 
Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91) (Collective Agreements Recommendation) at article 5(1):  
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‘… the Marikana experience and the strike violence that has marred the South African 
labour market in recent times reveal the flaws in the majoritarian framework and the 
changed dynamic of the collective bargaining environment. It may be time to return to 
the drawing board.’208 
 
There are academic calls for the harmonisation of Western and African values.209 The tailoring 
of majoritarianism in the South African context should have, as its substratum, the principle of 
Ubuntu. Cameron J missed an opportunity to contribute to the transformative interpretation 
jurisprudence.  
 
c) A transformative interpretation — the death and resurrection of Ubuntu 
 
The Constitution is said to have set itself the mission of transforming society in both the public 
and private sphere.210 It sets out to transform the South African society from one deeply divided 
by racism and inequality, to one based on democracy, social justice, equality, dignity and 
freedom.211 Put differently, the Constitution seeks to remove structural violence and promote 
peace and prosperity. That transformation, to a large extent, is yet to take place in the South 
African labour market. In discussing the counter majoritarian dilemma, De Vos et al emphasise 
that judges, as non-elected officials, must apply the Constitution, instead of imposing their will 
or personal convictions on the majority of citizens, whilst pursuing the Constitution’s 
transformative agenda.212 They correctly argue that:  
 
‘… democracy, when viewed substantively and especially in a plural political society, 
is never simply majority rule. While the elected representative of the political majority 
must exercise political power in a democratic society, this does not necessarily give the 
majority a blank cheque to govern in whatever way it desires.’213 
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By putting in place checks and balances, such as judicial review, the drafters of the Constitution 
make a concession that democracy does not entail relying simply on a numbers game and then 
allowing the majority to treat the minority in whatever manner it pleases. As it stands, the LRA 
is being implemented in this undesirable manner. De Vos continues: 
 
‘Democracy entails more than conferring power on a particular majority on any given 
day. It also necessarily entails finding a balance between enabling those in the majority 
to govern and limiting the things that they can do while in power, especially where such 
power can be used to violate the rights of others or undermine the very nature of 
democracy.’214 
 
Indeed the current form of majoritarianism undermines democracy. It provides for the 
protection of the hegemony of a majority union and empowers that union to place almost 
insurmountable obstacles in the way of minority unions, and strips them of the right to strike 
on many issues. As discussed above, without the right to strike, the minority union becomes a 
toothless dog, left to collectively beg for crumbs falling off the table of the majority union. 
This affects freedom of association as employees will be less inclined to associate with a union 
that is powerless to remedy their grievances. The undemocratic nature of the current regime 
can be seen in dictum of the court in POPCRU v Ledwaba215 where the court held that the 
purpose of s 18 of the LRA is:  
 
‘to regulate the admission of trade unions to the bargaining relationship with the 
employer so as to avoid a situation of proliferation by a multitude of small trade unions 
in one employer and in particular where there is already an established relationship 
with a majority trade union.’ 
 
Not only is this stance undemocratic, it fosters an ideology underlying the legal framework 
regulating strikes in South Africa that is adversarial, where the yielding of power is used to 
oppress and subjugate the vulnerable minority. If strike violence is to be uprooted, a 
fundamental shift of ideology is required that will bring a move away from the current 
adversarial position to one of collegiality and cooperation predicated upon the concept of 
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Ubuntu. Consider for instance the words of Cele J in Chamber of Mines of SA v Association of 
Mineworkers & Construction Union:216   
 
‘If the minority employees represented at the workplace by AMCU were to succeed and 
have a new wage agreement to come about and to supplant the existing collective 
agreement, the minorities would be governing for the majority in the workplace. That 
result is certainly undesirable.’217 
 
Earning better wages is not the undesirable part, surely employees want that, but the issue is in 
the ‘who’ succeeded in obtaining those better wages. This demonstrates the adversarial ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ way of thinking that the LRA fosters, there must be a paradigm shift toward a ‘one 
for all, all for one’ approach. It is proposed that infusing Ubuntu into the interpretation of the 
LRA will produce the desired effect. 
 
Langa DP (as he was then) said a ‘spirit of transition and transformation characterises the 
constitutional enterprise as a whole’.218 No human being is an island but all live in association 
with other people. This is often expressed in the Zulu phrase umuntu ngu umuntu ngabantu, 
which literally means that a person is a person because of support from others. This Zulu phrase 
emphasises the communality and interdependence of the members of the community and that 
every individual is an extension of others.219 In addition, the phrase teaches people that in 
certain instances, individuals can better perform their duties if they collaborate and join forces 
with each other, for example through the formation of unions in the labour relations 
environment.  
 
It is difficult to define the concept of Ubuntu, so it has been described according to its 
characteristics. Relevant to this discussion is the description offered by Mokgoro J who said:  
 
‘While [ubuntu] envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, 
human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense 
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it denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, 
marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation.’220 
 
In the same case, Langa J stated that an ‘outstanding feature’ of Ubuntu is the value it places 
on life and human dignity and that ‘the life of another person is at least as valuable as one’s 
own’ where ‘respect for the dignity of every person is integral to this concept’.221 More 
fittingly, he explained that: 
 
‘During violent conflicts and times when violent crime is rife, distraught members of 
society decry the loss of ubuntu. Thus heinous crimes are the antithesis of ubuntu. 
Treatment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu.’222 
  
As Chief Justice Langa quoted with approval the words of Kwame Gyekye that ‘an individual 
human person cannot develop and achieve the fullness of his/her potential without the concrete 
act of relating to other individual persons’.223 
 
Cameron J in AMCU v Chamber of Mines missed an opportunity to enforce the transformative 
agenda of the Constitution and test the collective bargaining framework, particularly 
majoritarianism, in light of Ubuntu. It is submitted that adding this distinctly African flavour 
to our collective bargaining legal framework cannot be gainsaid as it will eradicate structural 
violence and concomitant strike violence, whilst strengthening the economy of the country as 
a whole.224 
 
2.3 Use of replacement labour and non-striking employees 
 
 2.3.1 Replacement labour 
 
A blatant form of structural violence against workers is the LRA’s provision that permits the 
use of replacement labour during a strike.225 The employer is permitted to enforce the ‘no work, 
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no pay’ rule226 to inflict economic harm on employees. At the same time employers are 
permitted to carry on production during a strike, through non-striking employee and/or 
replacement workers, thus undermining, if not totally eradicating, the economic pressure the 
workers are trying to exert on the employer by striking.227 It only seems inevitable that this 
structural violence is going to escalate to physical violence when striking workers come into 
contact with the replacement workers or non-striking employees, and in some instances, even 
against management.228  
 
In Mahlangu v SATAWU, Passenger Rail Agency of SA & Another,229 the employer responded 
to a strike called by SATAWU by employing a replacement worker, namely Mahlangu, the 
plaintiff in this matter. Whilst commuting to work, Mahlangu was approached by people 
unknown to her whom she later claimed to be members of SATAWU, one of them being the 
employee Mahlangu had replaced. They lured Mahlangu to the city with a promise of a 
lucrative job. On this journey to the promised land, Mahlangu was attacked by these SATAWU 
members. They ultimately stripped Mahlangu naked and threw her off a moving train, suffering 
serious injuries as a result. She claimed damages against SATAWU.  
 
The court found against Mahlangu stating that the place where the assault occurred was not in 
close proximity to the designated area for the strike gathering and that the union could not be 
held liable for acts of its members committed outside of such designated area.230  
 
The court failed to address the underlying structural violence, which in essence caused the 
physical violence in the matter. It is also doubtful that this proximity test applied by the court 
is good law. The preferred test is the one enunciated in Ngubane v South African Transport 
                                                          
‘(1) An employer may not take into employment any person— 
(a) to continue or maintain production during a protected strike if the whole or a part of the employer’s 
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employment service or an independent contractor.’ 
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Services,231 where the court held there are four basic considerations in each case which 
influence the reaction of a reasonable man to a situation posing a foreseeable risk of harm to 
others:  
 
(a) The degree or extent of the risk created by the actor’s conduct;  
(b) The gravity of the possible consequences if the risk of harm materialises;  
(c) The utility of the actor’s conduct; and  
(d) The burden of eliminating the risk of harm. 
 
2.3.2 Non-striking employees 
 
In Marikana, a non-striking employee was stripped naked and beaten before being stabbed and 
burnt to death by his striking colleagues, and the reason forwarded for such barbarism was that 
the deceased chose to work whilst others were striking.232 This was not an isolated incident. A 
non-Marikana example was in Food and Allied Workers Union obo Kapesi v Premier Foods,233 
where evidence was placed before the court to the effect that strikers subjected several non-
striking employees and members of management to physical assaults, death threats were 
issued, and their homes and cars were firebombed. The death threats were carried out by fatally 
shooting one employee who identified his assailants, and a further plot to assassinate a director 
was uncovered in time to save the director.  
 
The court could do no more than mention the obvious, that strikers do not act criminally with 
impunity. There can be very little doubt that the strikers themselves were aware of this fact, 
but they vehemently carried on with unprecedented tenacity. This is evidence of a need to 
tackle the underlying issues of structural violence that is turning our workers into beasts.  
 
The study argues that replacement labour provisions should be repealed and replaced with a 
proportionality provision. Such provision will entail that wages that the workers would have 
received for the period of the strike are reduced by the percentage of the workforce that the 
workers made available to the employer i.e. if the workers and the employer agree that during 
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a strike, 50% of the workers will work, then the total amount of wages for the period is reduced 
by 50%. The rest of the 50% is shared among the entire workforce, not just those who worked.    
 
This is in conformity with the Ubuntu principle and creates a win–win situation for all. Firstly, 
it will remove the need to hire replacement labour whom the employer may even still need to 
train because there will be an agreement (either on an ad hoc basis, or through a collective 
agreement, or to be compulsorily agreed upon at conciliation before a certificate of non-
resolution is issued, or through a ministerial promulgation regulating an industry) that a certain 
percentage will work in order to preserve the business so that strikers still have a job to go after 
the strike. Consistent with Ubuntu, employer and employee will recognise and embrace their 
dependence on one another, thereby removing the adversarial paradigm, and promptly 
replacing it with the interdependence, Ubuntu way of thinking. Tensions will be eased fostering 
a spirit of inter-dependence and community in the workplace. 
 
Instead of being at opposing ends, all of the employees depend on one another to emerge from 
the strike better off. Non-striking workers will benefit from the concessions extracted from the 
employer by the strikers. Striking workers depend on the non-striking workers to preserve the 
business and provide some income that would otherwise have gone to replacement workers. It 
also means that the employees ‘take ownership’, so to speak, of the business because they 
recognise the need to preserve it, which will mean less vandalism and/or malicious 
interruptions of the business by striking workers. Gruesome scenes of violent attacks between 




The system of balloting is not new in the SA labour environment. Under the 1956 legislation 
ballots were a requirement and did not help eradicate violence until the Act was repealed in 
1995/4.234 It did not succeed in curbing strike violence and Tenza attributes this to the 
inextricable relationship between strikes and political protest which characterised the liberation 
struggle against the apartheid government.235 The argument is that given the relative political 
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calm of the modern era, this democratisation of the workplace should yield the desired fruit of 
bringing peace to the workplace.236 
 
It is submitted that in order to give true meaning to majoritarianism, all workers, 
notwithstanding union affiliation, should be permitted to vote on an issue raised by workers. 
The LRA should be amended to create this purer application of majoritarianism. It is a fallacy 
to assume that a majority union will hold the majority view on a particular point as employees 
may be indifferent to the views of the union’s leaders and they can express their own voice 
through a ballot. This will also serve to remind union leaders that they are there to serve the 
workers and should not use the power vested in them to push ulterior agendas, thus restoring 
trust between workers and unions. An added benefit is that those who are the minority are not 
simply shunned when they raise an issue simply because they are the majority. They will be 
given an audience among colleagues, who will then vote after applying their minds. The result 
will be reduced frustrations and tension in the workplace, which in turn should reduce strike-
related violence. 
 
A further ancillary benefit will be that balloting will result in workers realising the value of 
creating allies, rather than rivalries, with one another, irrespective of union affiliation. This will 
make for a peaceful and more fruitful working environment. The current form of 
majoritarianism creates an adversarial environment where it is a case of ‘join us or we will 
oppress you’. This form of majoritarianism will be more in line with principles of Ubuntu, 
which are enshrined in our Constitution,237 which in this context entails ‘Motho ke motho ka 
batho’, a Sotho saying which translates ‘a person is a person through other people’.238 It 
encapsulates the value that by banding together, all stakeholders account for the common 
growth and prosperity of all. The current status quo promotes the stance that for one to grow, 
someone else must fall, which is repugnant to the values of the Constitution. It should also be 
borne in mind that most of the strikers are black Africans who are brought up with values of 
Ubuntu and when they reach the workplace, they find this adversarial form of majoritarianism, 
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hence the need to tailor our majoritarianism to suit our culture and Ubuntu. The words of the 
Constitutional Court in Mayelane v Ngwenyama239 bear repeating in this context: 
 
‘… the inherent flexibility of customary law provides room for consensus-seeking and 
the prevention and resolution, in family and clan meetings, of disputes and 
disagreements; and … [that] these aspects provide a setting which contributes to the 
unity of family structures and the fostering of co-operation, a sense of responsibility 
and belonging in its members, as well as the nurturing of healthy communitarian 
traditions like ubuntu.’240 
 
This is the approach that the legislature, and Cameron J in AMCU v Chamber of Mines, should 
have adopted in labour disputes. It was this spirit of camaraderie that ultimately won the 
freedom of South Africa from its oppressors; it is this spirit that will economically emancipate 
the down trodden.  
 
3  Conclusion 
 
The chapter has described structural violence as the antithesis of the constitutional aspiration 
to ‘… Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person …’. 
Structural violence is the denial of freedom and liberty of people to seek a better life and fulfil 
their potential. When structural violence is perpetrated on workers, it fosters a spirit of defiance 
and frustration, leading to physical violence. The chapter demonstrated how majoritarianism is 
an implement of structural violence and how it contributes to physical violence. A further form 
of structural violence is that the LRA’s permission for employers to use replacement labour, 
leads to violent confrontations with strikers and such workers. The chapter further explores the 
use of ballots and how they can create a more tailored form of majoritarianism and end the 
violence. The chapter identifies the principle as the key to eradicating violence in the workplace 
and creating an environment conducive for the prosperity of all concerned.  
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Given the prevalence of strike-related violence in South Africa, there is a need to address the 
issue of liability flowing from such conduct and how to appropriately compensate those who 
suffer damages as a consequence of violent conduct. Currently the law is not very clear as to 
who should take responsibility for the loss incurred during industrial action, whether in the 
form of a strike, picket or protest action. The LRA does, however, state that certain conduct 
may create grounds for taking action against those responsible. This may require the Labour 
Court to take active steps to deter such conduct and award compensation to victims for loss 
suffered as a result thereof.   
The chapter looks at misconduct as a ground for taking action against wrongdoers and argues 
that the whole group involved in the commission of misconduct may be dismissed on the 
ground of derivative misconduct if the employer is unable to identify the actual perpetrator. It 
further investigates the possibility of extending the application of the doctrine of vicarious 
liability to apply to a trade union and member relationship. The objective is to have someone 
answerable for the unlawful conduct perpetrated during strikes when no one is willing to 
shoulder the blame.  
 
2 Grounds for holding union and/or members liable 
 
2.1 Liability on the basis of misconduct  
 
Under common law, organisers and strikers alike are exposed to potential delictual and 
contractual liability.241 This is due to the application of the principle of sanctity of contract 
which requires that parties to a contract be bound to perform according to the terms of their 
contract(s). Under common law, a person who organises or partakes in a strike may be in breach 
of the employment contract and thus the employer may terminate the contract and claim 
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damages arising from the breach where losses have been incurred. The employer may also opt 
to sue for other damages suffered during the strike, provided the elements of the delict are 
met.242  
 
However, where such a strike is protected, the LRA exempts participants from contractual and 
civil liability.243 It states that such employees or members of the union are not in breach of 
contract; they are also not committing delict by virtue of being part of a protected strike.244 The 
exception applies if any act in the furtherance of a strike constitutes a criminal offence, the 
victim(s) will have the right to institute civil action against any person involved in the strike as 
per s 67(8) of the LRA, which effectively provides that immunity does not extend to conduct 
that constitutes an offence.245 Persons affected by violence are then at liberty to approach the 
Labour Court for remedies, which may include interdicts, laying criminal charges, and civil 
claims for contractual and delictual damages.  
 
2.1.1 Misconduct and the sanction of dismissal 
 
Misconduct may constitute a fair reason for dismissal.246 Like any other form of dismissal, a 
dismissal for misconduct must be substantively and procedurally fair.247 From the cases 
discussed throughout this study, it is noted that the most common forms of misconduct during 
strikes are:  
 
a) Damage to property 
 
According to item 3(4) of the Code, it is a serious misconduct to wilfully damage the property 
of the employer. The same seriousness should apply regarding malicious damage caused to the 
property of third parties as such conduct constitutes criminal conduct for which a sanction of 
dismissal may be appropriate.  
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Assault is defined as the unlawful and intentional application of force, or the threat thereof, to 
a person.248 The crime of assault is wide enough to include pushing and shoving.249 According 
to item 3(4) of the Code, physical assault on the employer, colleagues, clients, or customers, 
constitutes serious misconduct. Strikers who engage in such criminal conduct do so at the risk 




It is a common practice for strikers to issue threats against management, non-striking 
colleagues and replacement workers, with an intention to terrify or frighten to a state of 
timidity.250 Such conduct constitutes intimidation.251 The words uttered need not be directed at 
any particular individual.252 Strikers must refrain from such conduct lest they themselves face 
the threat of dismissal. 
 
Strikes must be peaceful and free of misconduct. The implication include two things. Firstly, 
strikers must be cognisant of the provisions of item 6 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, 
so as not to commit misconduct during strikes. Secondly, s 67(5) of the LRA allows for the 
dismissal of strikers for misconduct committed during a strike. Section 67(5) reads: 
 
‘(5) Subsection (4) does not preclude an employer from fairly dismissing an employee 
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII for a reason related to the employee’s 
conduct during the strike, or for a reason based on the employer’s operational 
requirements.’ 
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In RAM Transport (SA) (Pty) Ltd v South African Transport Allied Workers Union253 the court 
said: 
 
‘This court is always open to those who seek the protection of the right to strike. But 
those who commit acts of criminal and other misconduct during the course of strike 
action in breach of an order of this court must accept in future to be subjected to the 
severest penalties that this court is entitled to impose.’254   
 
It is often difficult for employers to gather evidence and impute liability on individual strikers. 
This is because misconduct can be committed by an individual or by a number of individuals 
acting collectively. The onus rests on the employer to prove misconduct.255 The issue for 
employers arises when a number of employees are involved in the commission of misconduct 
during strikes and the individual perpetrator cannot be identified. A simpler challenge arises 
when there is evidence against the actual perpetrators. For instance, in City of Cape Town v 
South African Municipal Workers Union obo and Others,256 metro police officers blockaded 
the N2 freeway, City bound thus causing traffic, during morning peak hours. Through the aid 
of cameras installed along the freeway, the employer was able to identify 117 employees who 
participated in the blockade. The employer convened a joint disciplinary hearing and dismissed 
all 117 employees on the strength of the evidence against each perpetrator. It gets complicated 
when there is a lack of evidence implicating specific perpetrators.   
 
A study of case law reveals that three possible distinct routes have been utilised by employers 
to dismiss groups of offenders. The criminal law principle of common purpose has been 
borrowed into the labour arena. Second is the principle of derivative misconduct, and lastly, 
misconduct has been fused with retrenchments to dismiss offenders. These are each discussed 
below:   
a) Doctrine of common purpose 
 
The criminal law doctrine of common purpose will apply to impute liability on a group of 
offenders if the employer can prove that each of the strikers actively associated himself or 
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herself with the actual perpetrators. This is almost an insurmountable hurdle for employers. In 
NSCAWU and Others v Coin Security Group t/a Coin Security257 the court found that 74 of the 
dismissed employees could not possibly have committed the misconducts and the employer 
furnished insufficient evidence that those employees had actively associated themselves with 
the actual perpetrators, whoever they may have been. 
 
It should be borne in mind though, that difficult as it is to prove the association aspect, the 
standard of proof, unlike in criminal law where it is beyond a reasonable doubt, in the labour 
context, is on a balance of probabilities. In Moahlodi v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd,258 
the court said: 
 
‘an employer need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an employee has 
committed an offence. The test to be applied is whether the employer had reasonable 
grounds for believing that the employee has committed the offence. It is sufficient if, 
after making his own investigations, he arrives at a decision on a balance of 
probabilities, that the offence was committed [by the employee] provided that he affords 
the employee a fair opportunity of stating his story in refutation of the charge.’ 
 
That said, it will be difficult to prove which employees associated themselves with the actual 
perpetrators when it is already difficult to identify the actual perpetrator. A possible avenue for 
employers is invoking the principle of derivative misconduct, as discussed next. 
 
b) Derivative misconduct 
 
The relationship between employer and employee is essentially one of trust and confidence, 
and, even at common law, conduct breaching such trust may warrant dismissal.259 In Robinson 
v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd,260 the court held that the duty owed to an employer 
by an employee is analogous to a fiduciary duty where the employee stands in a position of 
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confidence to protect the interests of the employer.261 When employees are aware of conduct 
not in the best interest of the employer, including the failure to assist the employer to bring the 
guilty to account, demonstrates bad faith on the part of the employee and violates the 
relationship of trust.262 In Council for Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen263 Harms JA 
said:  
 
‘It is well established that the relationship between employer and employee is in essence 
one of trust and confidence and that, at common law, conduct clearly inconsistent 
therewith entitles the “innocent party” to cancel the agreement.’264 
 
Perpetrators of misconduct during strikes are often difficult to identify as a result of insufficient 
evidence implicating any specific employee. It then becomes difficult for the employer to take 
disciplinary action. The doctrine of derivative misconduct can be invoked by employers to 
discipline employees who withhold information and/or evidence that the employer could use 
against the actual perpetrators.  
 
In Chauke and Others v Lee Service Centre t/a Leeson Motors265 the court defined derivative 
misconduct as: 
 
‘The situation where employees possess information that would enable an employer to 
identify wrongdoers and those employees who fail to come forward when asked to do 
so, violate the trust upon which the employment relationship is founded.’ 
 
The facts in Chauke are that, disgruntled by the dismissal of a shop steward for gross 
negligence, unidentified workshop staff members sabotaged the business by scratching newly 
repaired and sprayed cars. Following failed attempts to solicit information from the staff 
regarding the saboteurs, the employer issued an ultimatum to the staff that if the sabotage does 
not end, the entire workshop staff would be dismissed. The sabotage did not stop and the 
employer made good on the promise to dismiss the entire staff compliment. The staff, through 
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their union, contested that dismissal was contingent on proving individual culpability, to which 
the Industrial Court held that those who hold such a view are ‘living in a dream world’.266 The 
LAC as per Cameron JA, as he then was, further condemned the chimerical defence by stating 
that the misconduct ‘was perpetrated by the workers collectively, or on behalf of, and with the 
approval of the collectivity’.267 The court explained, with reference to Food and Allied Workers 
Union and Others v Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd,268 that there are two reasons 
justifying the dismissal of the collective in such circumstances. The first is the breach of a duty 
of good faith toward the employer, resulting in a breach of trust and therefore warranting 
dismissal. The second was that they ‘knew who was responsible, and deliberately chose to 
associate himself with him or them through silence’,269 which in essence is the doctrine of 
common purpose.  
 
In FAWU v ABI a large group of workers assaulted and seriously injured a replacement worker, 
a driver. As the trend goes, the workers were not forthcoming regarding the identity of the 
culprits. The employer reasoned that all the workers who had clocked in must have been in the 
vicinity of the strike and should have information and since such information was not 
forthcoming, the employer charged and dismissed all such workers. None of the employees 
disclosed any information throughout the disciplinary hearing or even at the Industrial Court. 
Nugent J held that: 
 
‘In the field of industrial relations, it may be that policy considerations require more of 
an employee than that he merely remained passive in circumstances like the present, 
and that his failure to assist in an investigation of this sort may in itself justify 
disciplinary action.’270  
And:  
‘Though the dismissal is designed to target the perpetrators of the original misconduct, 
the justification is wide enough to encompass those innocent of it, but who through their 
silence make themselves guilty of a derivative violation of trust and confidence.’271 
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In RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd) v Grogan NO 
and others,272 an anonymous whistle blower informed the employer that a large quantity of 
mineral samples was hidden down a borehole on the laboratory property. The employer 
retrieved the samples and started questioning the laboratory staff regarding the said samples. 
Initially all of this staff denied any knowledge of the samples but one employee later admitted 
that he and three other colleagues were involved with dumping the said samples. The employer 
then charged these four employees along with other staff members who had worked overtime 
during the time the dumping occurred on the basis that they ought to have reported the 
perpetrators to the employer. The employer then dismissed all of these employees. In the 
arbitration findings,273 Grogan stated that two factors must be present for a successful 
derivative misconduct dismissal. Firstly, it must be proven that the employee knew or could 
have known of the wrongdoing. Secondly, the employee unjustifiably failed to disclose, or 
assist the employer to acquire that knowledge. On review, the Labour Court confirmed 
Grogan’s findings that the dismissals for derivative misconduct were fair. 
 
Applied too broadly, the use of derivative misconduct could result in the innocent being 
implicated. The leading case regarding curtailing the operation of derivative misconduct is the 
Western Platinum Refinery Ltd v Hlebela and Others (‘Hlebela’).274 The facts are briefly that 
the employee was dismissed largely based on circumstantial evidence as direct evidence 
implicating the employee could not be found. Theft was rife at the employer’s business and the 
employee was identified by the South African Police Service as a suspect because the 
employee’s lavish lifestyle did not accord with his meagre salary. The court pointed out that 
the employee was charged with failing/refusing to disclose his personal information, rather 
than for information regarding the actual stock theft. The court held: 
 
‘Even an unreasonable refusal to disclose the employee’s personal finances and a 
reasonable inference that he did so to conceal the manner of their acquisition is not 
capable of being logically linked to the fact that he has actual knowledge of wrongdoing 
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by others. When the employer is thwarted by a non-disclosure to procure information, it 
cannot be argued that the employer can infer proof of what it suspects.’275 
 
The court went on to hold that there was no case against the employee. From the judgment, the 
following factors for assessing the appropriateness of dismissal for derivative misconduct can 
be extrapolated:276 
 
1) The withheld knowledge must be actual. The lack of good faith is derived from the 
deliberate choice to withhold the information. Imputed knowledge will not suffice;  
2) The seriousness of the misconduct the employee failed to disclose; 
3) The effect of the non-disclosure on the employer’s ability to stop or mitigate against 
the effects of the misconduct;  
4) The employee’s rank does not affect culpability, but may be aggravating or 
mitigating depending on the circumstances of the case; 
5) The duty to disclose is triggered when the information is acquired, not when the 
employer asks. It will be aggravating when the information is withheld even after 
the employer’s request.   
 
In the recent case of Dunlop Mixing and Technical Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v National 
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) obo Nganezi and Others,277 NUMSA and its 
members embarked on a protected strike over a wage dispute. The strike degenerated into 
violence where strikers damaged property and violently confronted management and employer 
representatives. The employer successfully approached the Labour Court for an interdict 
prohibiting the unlawful conduct of the employees. Ignoring the interdict, the strikers continued 
with their misconduct. Ultimately the employer dismissed the strikers for derivative 
misconduct. The CCMA in its award emphasised that derivative misconduct is premised on the 
failure of employees to be forthcoming with information that can assist the employer identify 
perpetrators of the acts of misconduct during a strike and went on to find that the dismissal was 
both substantively and procedurally fair for some employees, but not for others on the basis of 
insufficient evidence. The employer took the matter on review and the LC reiterated that 
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employees have a duty of good faith toward the employer, the breach of which warrants 
dismissal. The LC overturned the decision of the CCMA and found that the dismissal was fair.  
 
There is accordingly scope to argue that workers who commit, or witness others committing, 
misconduct during strikes are duty bound to inform the employer or face dismissal based on 
the grounds of breach of the duty of good faith and/or acting in common purpose.  
 
It may be that the common-law duty to disclose is not invulnerable to a constitutional challenge 
for encroaching on the rights to remain silent and to be presumed innocent.278 To a large extent 
the information required may be self-incriminating evidence such as in the Hlebela279 case, or 
FAWU v ABI.280 In RSA Geological281 the whistle blowers were dismissed on the strength of 
the evidence that they provided the employer. However, it is submitted that the said curtailment 
of these constitutional rights are justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution, given a) the 
relationship of trust between employer and employee b) the general problems employers face, 
for instance, in controlling shrinkage through theft, c) and more specifically for our purposes, 
in curbing strike violence which has led to the deaths of many people, whilst negatively 
impacting the economy of the country as a whole.  
 
c) The fusion of misconduct and operational requirements 
 
An avenue worth exploring for employers is dismissal based on operational requirements282 
arising from misconduct during a strike.283 The employer must however prove that the 
                                                          
278 S 35 of  the Constitution stipulates: 
‘(3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right— 
... 
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279 Hlebela Note 274. 
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dismissal was as a result of operational requirements based on the economic viability of the 
business, as opposed to misconduct. The provisions of s 189 of the LRA must be adhered to 
for this form of dismissal. 
 
In Food and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Kapesi and Others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a 
Blue Ribbon Salt River,284 following a two-month long violent strike, the employer suspended 
employees suspected of misconduct pending disciplinary action. It became impossible to hold 
the said disciplinary hearing as witnesses were not prepared to give evidence due to 
intimidation. One key witness for the employer suddenly disappeared before the disciplinary 
hearing and had not resurfaced even five years down the line at the time of the LAC hearing.  
 
Having no evidentiary basis for dismissals based on misconduct, the employer was advised to 
pursue the operational requirement route and retrench the employees suspected of involvement 
in the misconduct. The employer implemented this advice, a CCMA facilitator was appointed, 
and due process was followed in dismissing the employees.285 The court considered the 
definition of an operational requirement,286 and held that the definition is sufficiently broad to 
include a situation where unmanageable instability in the workplace threatened the subsistence 
of the business. As such, the LAC was willing to accept that the employer could go the 
retrenchment route, but the matter turned on the selection criteria for retrenching employees, 
namely whether or not employers can select employees based on untested allegations of 
misconduct. The LAC ordered the reinstatement of the employees on the basis that the 
implementation of the selection criteria, namely suspicion of misconduct, resulted in unfairness 
where employees could not contest the evidence, if the employer even had any.287 
 
In SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Pep Stores,288 the court 
held that where the employee’s misconduct during strikes threatens the viability of the 
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business, the employer can, in principle, retrench employees. The employees would be 
retrenched in order to save the business, not for their misconduct per se.289  
 
In Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries v Levy NO and Others290 the employer, faced 
with serious threats and intimidation from striking workers, decided to shut down its business 
pending the finalisation of the retrenchment proceedings. The court confirmed the dismissals 
on operational grounds notwithstanding the elements of misconduct.  
 
Mischke observes that it is now clear that there is some scope for an employer to dismiss 
employees on the basis of operational requirements instead of dismissing them for misconduct 
committed during strikes.291  
 
There is however a circularity to this approach that does not advance the employer’s objectives. 
In most instances, it will precisely be because the employer is unable to obtain evidence of the 
misconduct that dismissal for operational requirements is resorted to. The fair selection criteria 
then becomes a seemingly insurmountable obstacle when the evidence of misconduct is not 
forthcoming, and when such evidence is forthcoming, then there is no need to resort to 
retrenchments. The retrenchment route may be well suited to circumstances such as in Tiger 
Food Brands Ltd t/a Albany Bakeries where the employer temporarily shuts down the business 
amidst the strike violence and retrenches the employees. In most instances this will not be an 
option for most employers. It is submitted that, in such circumstances, employers are better off 
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2.2 Liability on the basis of vicarious liability 
The doctrine of vicarious liability was imported into our law in the late seventeenth century 
from English law.292 This doctrine is regulated by the common law,293 customary law294 and 
developed by the courts to bring it in line with the Constitution.295 The doctrine is motivated 
by considerations of public policy, which demand that persons who have been harmed by the 
wrongs of others should not be left without a claim.296 
 
Vicarious liability can only be invoked once a delict has been committed.297 A delict is 
committed when an unlawful act or omission by a blameworthy person causes damage to 
another person who has a civil remedy for recovery of such damages.298 The elements of a 
delict are: 
 
a) An act or omission; 
b) Unlawfulness; 
c) Fault; 
d) Causation; and 
e) Loss.299 
 
The general rule is that only the person who commits the delict should be held liable.300 
Vicarious liability is the exception to this rule since it permits for others to be held liable for 
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delictual acts of others.301 Vicarious liability is premised upon the relationship between the 
actual perpetrator and the person actually being held liable.302 It is submitted that vicarious 
liability should be extended to include the union-member relationship for purposes of holding 
unions liable for delicts committed by their members during a strike. 
 
Our law does not specify that unions can be held liable for the conduct of members during 
industrial action. There are no reported cases where the doctrine of vicarious liability was 
extended to include the trade union-member relationship. So far the doctrine of vicarious 
liability applies to certain relationships such as insurance contracts, employer-employee 
relationship, driver and owner of motor vehicle etc.  
 
Given the malice of strike violence and its concomitant negative effect on the economy, it is 
submitted that public policy considerations dictate that the doctrine of vicarious liability be 
applied to the union-member scenario. Support for this conclusion is found in s 39(2) of the 
Constitution, which reads: 
 
‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.’ 
 
It is thus proposed that courts take a serious look into the operations of vicarious liability and 
declare its operation on the union-member relationship.303 Such extension will be based on two 
tenets. The first is that the union has a sufficiently controlling relationship on its members. The 
second is that the union creates the risk of harm to others when convening a picket.  
 
a) The risk creating factor 
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In the employer-employee relationship, it is trite law that the employer can be held liable for 
the delicts committed by the employee. Over a century ago in Mkhize v Martens,304 the 
employer’s servant negligently started a fire that caused damage on the neighbouring farm. The 
court held that by having servants who prove to be ‘negligent or inefficient or 
untrustworthy’,305 the master creates the risk of harm to others and should be held vicariously 
liable for the harm caused to others by that servant.306 Brassey says ‘employers are likely to be 
held liable if they provided the opportunity or conditions for the injurious act to occur or had 
the power to prevent it.’307 
 
Similarly, trade unions are aware that, due to the acrimonious nature of strikes, there is a risk 
that their members may resort to violence during a strike as is normally the case recently. They 
convene the strike notwithstanding this risk. In Xstrata SA (Pty) Ltd v AMCU and Others308 the 
court held: 
 
‘It has become noticeable that unions are readily and easily prepared to lead employees 
out on any form of industrial action, whether lawful or not. The perception that a union 
has no obligation whatsoever to control its members during such activities, which are 




‘there is a relationship of guardianship between the union and its members. The 
leadership, be it shop stewards or the national leadership, were elected on the basis 
that the members trust them to lead and guide them. In as much as the members can be 
guided on whether to embark on a strike action or some other protest action, in the 
same vein, the leadership, including shop stewards, should also lead and guide 
members and advise them to behave lawfully during actions undertaken. Leadership 
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and guidance by the union should persist until the end of the action undertaken, and 
not end at the point that the action commences.’310  
 
Although a union is a mandate-driven organisation, it leads its members into a strike, and 
therefore into a risky situation. The union-member relationship is such that the union can 
exercise a sufficient degree of control over its members. If the union does not take steps to 
prevent harm to others, then the author argues that the convening union should be held 
vicariously liable for the harm arising out of the risk they created.  
 
b) Close connection 
 
This factor concerns itself with the remoteness of the harm-causing act, to the conduct expected 
or authorised by the union. If the harm-causing act falls within the ambit of what was foreseen 
or authorised by the union, then the union should be held liable.  
 
c)  South African and foreign case law   
 
In Mondi Ltd (Mondi Kraft Division) v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied 
Workers Union311 the employees embarked on a protected strike but whilst on the strike, they 
unlawfully switched off machinery at its mill, resulting in the employer suffering damages. The 
employer claimed these damages from the trade union based on vicarious liability for delicts 
of its members. The employer claimed that the delict was committed with the support and 
encouragement of the members of the shop stewards council. The Labour Court turned its 
attention on the union-member relation to determine whether it is one where vicarious liability 
applies. It held that the relationship is not comparable with the employment relationship and 
that the only other basis for liability could be that of agency. It held that the employer failed to 
prove the union was the principal and the members its agents. 
 
The court’s application of vicarious liability demonstrates the urgent need to develop the 
principle in our law. The court should have recognised the union-member relationship as a 
category unto itself of the set of relationships known to attract vicarious liability. The court’s 
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approach has led to an untenable situation where unions can create risk and sit back, or even 
encourage, the materialisation of that risk knowing they will be absolved from liability. In 
In2Food (Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union and Others312 the Labour Court said: 
 
‘The time has come in our labour relations history that trade unions should be held 
accountable for the actions of their members. For too long trade unions have glibly 
washed their hands of the violent actions of their members.’313  
 
The LAC in same case of FAWU v In2Food (Pty) Ltd314 added that:  
 
‘The respondent’s thesis that a trade union, as a matter of principle, has a duty to curb 
unlawful behaviour by its members indeed enjoys merit. Indeed, the principle of union 
accountability for its actions or omissions is beginning to gain recognition.’  
And:  
‘… when there is evidence to implicate the union vicariously in the unlawful acts of its 
members, there may well be an action available to the respondent for redress …’315 
 
For this to happen, it is argued that the following requirements must be met for such 
transference of liability: 
 
(a)  A delict must have been committed by striking employees.  
 
(b)  The striking employees in (a) must have been members of the defendant union.  
 
(c)  The delict falls within the purview of the union’s instructions, or the risk created 
by such union.316 
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These judgments reveal an inclination by the courts to hold unions accountable for the unlawful 
conduct of their members. This is a welcome stance given the menace of strike violence. 
Unions will have to take steps to mitigate against the risk they create and to control their 
members.317  
 
These judgments are also compatible with international trends. In Canada it is settled law that 
unions can be held liable for delictual acts of their members.318 In the United States of America 
the National Labor Relations Board has held as follows: 
 
‘Where a union authorizes a picket line, it is required to retain control over the 
picketing. If a union is unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to control its 
pickets, it must bear the responsibility for their misconduct. Similarly, if pickets engage 
in misconduct in the presence of a union agent, and that agent fails to disavow that 
conduct and take corrective measures, the union may be held responsible.’319 
 
Unions must take reasonable steps to prevent the harm. Such steps may include suspending or 
calling off the strike at the point where it degenerates into violence.320 In this regard it is 
suggested that the LRA needs to be amended to give the LC this power. Although this may not 
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2.3 Revocation of protection  
 
It will be recalled that when a strike is protected, the strikers enjoy immunity from civil and 
contractual liability. If a strike, by virtue of strikers choosing to become violent, loses its 
protected status, then the immunity will be removed and the union and its members will be 
exposed to common law and statutory remedies, particularly s 68 of the LRA, available to those 
who have suffered harm as a result of the violent strike. This section examines arguments 
canvassed by commentators on the issue. 
 
Sections 157 and 158 of the LRA dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of the Labour Court 
respectively, do not make a direct provision for the removal of the protected status of a strike. 
The Labour Court is empowered to issue interdicts,321 however, as discussed in chapter 2 
above, a protected strike cannot be interdicted. As such, the focal point for the removal of the 
protected status of a strike has been around the ‘purpose’ and ‘functionality’ principles. There 
is an intricate connection between ‘purpose’ and ‘functionality’ in collective bargaining. In 
Afrox Ltd v SA Chemical Workers Union and Others,322 the court held that once the dispute 
giving rise to the strike is resolved, the strike must end and the right to strike falls away. The 
court said that in these circumstances, the foundations of the strike fall away: 
 
‘The strike is no longer functional; it has no purpose and it terminates. When the strike 
terminates so does its protection. It is not in the interests of labour peace for a strike 
action to be continued in such circumstances even in the case of a protected strike.’323 
 
                                                          
321 ‘158. Powers of Labour Court 
(1) The Labour Court may— 
(a) make any appropriate order, including 
(i) the grant of urgent interim relief; 
(ii) an interdict; 
(iii) an order directing the performance of any particular act which order, when implemented, will 
remedy a wrong and give effect to the primary objects of this Act; 
(iv) a declaratory order; 
(v) an award of compensation in any circumstances contemplated in this Act; 
(vi) an award of damages in any circumstances contemplated in this Act; and 
(vii) an order for costs; ...’ 
322 (1997) 18 ILJ 406 (LC). 
323 Ibid at 411A. 
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It appears from the Afrox decision that the purpose of a strike is to pressure the employer to 
accede to the demands of the workers.324 That purpose is not merely to strike for the sake of it; 
it must be linked to an objective, and that objective becomes the purpose of the strike. Section 
27(4) of the Interim Constitution325 provided that ‘Workers shall have the right to strike for the 
purpose of collective bargaining.’326 The same notion is captured in the definition of strike in 
the LRA.327 Functionality simply means acts made in the furtherance or advancement of that 
purpose. 
 
In Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA Workers Union and Others328 
the court held that:  
 
‘… When the tyranny of the mob displaces the peaceful exercise of economic pressure 
as the means to the end of the resolution of a labour dispute, one must question whether 
a strike continues to serve its purpose and thus whether it continues to enjoy protected 
status.’329 
 
From that last sentence, Rycroft concludes that strike violence is an end in itself, and on that 
basis, argues that a strike may lose its protected status.330 The Labour Court cited this reasoning 
with approval in the recent decision in Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd v National Union 
of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied Workers (‘NUFBWSAW’),331 where it held that the 
courts would intervene to declare a strike unprotected depending on the degree of violence 
perpetrated by the strikers.332 Cognisant of the need to curb strike violence, the court cited and 
aligned itself with Rycroft’s suggestion that a strike that has become violent, to a sufficient 
                                                          
324 This is also in line with s 27(4) of the Bill of Rights. 
325 Act 200 of 1993. 
326 Ibid. 
327 S 213 of the LRA provides: 
‘“strike” means the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, 
by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the purpose 
of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
employer.’ (Emphasis added.) 
328 Note 15. 
329 Ibid para 13. 
330 Rycroft note 28.  
331 National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied Workers (NUFBWSAW) & Others v Universal Product 
Network (Pty) Ltd; In re: Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and 
Allied Workers (NUFBWSAW) & Others (J2182/2015) [2015] ZALCJHB 421; (2016) 37 ILJ 476 (LC); [2016] 4 BLLR 
408 (LC). See also Fergus Note 27.  
332 Universal Product Network note 75 para 38.  
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To that it is persuasive to respond: 
 
‘Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in 
anyone’s head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, 
to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.’ (Amilcar 
Cabral.)334 
 
Whilst the debate regarding the justifiability of using violence to obtain one’s objectives is 
beyond the scope of this paper — save to mention that because one is disagreeable to the means 
chosen, does not follow that there is no legitimate end — with all due respect, the conclusion 
that violence strips a strike of its purpose or functionality is not correct.335  
 
The functionality aspect is not a requirement for a protected strike. Fergus traces the origins of 
this principle to the pre-constitutional era,336 which on its own speaks volumes of its underlying 
philosophy of structural violence. Considering that strikes were ‘one of the few mechanisms 
which disenfranchised black workers had at their disposal to voice their contempt for the 
apartheid regime and to contest their socio-economic circumstances’,337 Du Toit makes the 
observation that the functionality requirement was a weapon in the hands of conservative courts 
used to quash the aspirations of workers.338  
                                                          
333 Ibid para 32, citing Rycroft Note 27.  
334 Neil Coleman Towards new Collective Bargaining, Wage and Social Protection Strategies in South Africa – 
Learning from the Brazilian Experience.  
335 See also E Fergus Note 27 at 1547 where she correctly questions: ‘Does violence during a strike necessarily 
mean that the strikers are no longer pursuing objectives which may not be pursued by way of protected industrial 
action? In at least some cases, it is precisely in the frustrated pursuit of ‘legitimate’ bargaining objectives that 
the violence is committed.’ (Emphasis added to point out the link between structural violence and physical 
violence.)  
336 E Fergus Note 27 at 1539 referring to the decision in Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels 
CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel (BAWU) (1993) 14 ILJ 963 (LAC).  
337 E Fergus Note 27 at 1542. 
338 D du Toit et al. Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 6 ed (2015) 514–15.  
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Whilst it is logical that acts associated with the strike must be functional to collective 
bargaining, in the sense that they must advance the purpose or objectives of the strike, the trend 
has become that functionality has become a legal requirement for a strike to enjoy protection. 
For instance Rycroft argues that a strike that has turned violent to a sufficient degree becomes 
dysfunctional to collective bargaining and should therefore lose its protection. Indeed the 
violence may be calculated, whether justifiably or not, at advancing the objectives of the strike 
and for that reason is functional, obviously not peacefully, but is functional nonetheless as it is 
aimed at realising the objectives of the strike. Fergus’ view that violence may not be functional 
to ‘peaceful’ collective bargaining, but may be functional to collective bargaining, is the 
preferred view.339 In any event, the LRA does not make ‘functionality’ a requirement for the 
protection of a strike and the courts should distance themselves from such views.  
 
The notion that a strike that turns violent should lose its protected status is incontestable. The 
reason for such retraction of protection should not be that the strike has lost its bargaining 
purpose or has become dysfunctional. The correct approach for the withdrawal of protection 
should be based on the principle that no one is permitted to benefit from unlawful conduct. 
More about that later. For now the pitfalls of telling strikers that their strike is dysfunctional or 
has no purpose should be noted. It is counter-productive for the courts to hold that there is no 
bargaining purpose to a strike that has turned violent as that creates an impression in the minds 
of the workers that the court is antagonistic to the plight and struggles of the workers, leading 
to a collective spirit of defiance by the workers by becoming even more violent.340 In Hotz v 
UCT,341 Wallis JA made the following observation:  
 
‘The history of civil disobedience by outstanding historical figures such as Mahatma 
Ghandi, Martin Luther King, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to mention but a few, is 
an honourable one. At times it involved breaches of the law, such as Rosa Parks’ 
dignified and steadfast refusal to sit on the bus in the seats reserved for Black people, 
or the thousands in this country who burnt the hated dompas in protest against the Pass 
Laws, that were imposed by an undemocratic government on an oppressed majority, 
                                                          
339 E Fergus Note 27 at 1547. 
340 See the discussion on the failure of interdicts in Chapter 5. 
341 (730/2016) [2016] ZASCA 159 (20 October 2016). 
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and lacked any moral content. Civil disobedience by those individuals was a challenge 
to an unjust or oppressive political and legal system, which is not present in our 
constitutional dispensation.’342 
 
Workers may perceive any notion that their strikes serve no purpose as patronising and hostile 
and it is submitted that the courts steer clear of that approach as it might incite further violence 
and civil disobedience as evidenced by the erosion of the respect for the rule of law, similar to 
the trend during the apartheid era where people refused to recognise unjust laws. The courts 
would do well to be cognisant of their role as neutral arbiters in this power game of collective 
bargaining and take care not to portray an impression, even if only perceived, of exacerbating 
structural violence by further placing obstacles in the way of the workers and unduly supporting 
and protecting the capitalist at the expense of those who already suffer from structural violence.  
 
The approach of the Constitutional Court in Unitrans,343 comes as a welcome relief. Zondo J 
said that a strike can only lose its protected status when: 
 
‘Where the concerted refusal to work is resorted to in support of a demand made by a 
trade union or workers to an employer, the employer would need to comply fully and 
unconditionally with the demand in order for a protected strike to turn into an 
unprotected strike. Once the employer has remedied the grievance or complied with the 
demand or once the dispute has been resolved, the workers may not continue with their 
concerted refusal to work because the purpose for which they would have been entitled 
to withhold their labour would have been achieved. Any continued refusal to work 
would lack an authorised purpose. Therefore, the strike would be unprotected. Another 
way in which a protected strike would cease to be protected would be if the union or 
employees abandoned the authorised purpose of the concerted refusal to work and 
sought to achieve a different purpose that is not authorised. Yet another way would be 
if the employer and the union or workers were to reach an agreement that settles the 
dispute even if the employer has not complied fully and unconditionally with the 
original demand of the union and the workers. Absent any of these methods of turning 
                                                          
342 Ibid at Para 72. 
343 Transport and Allied Workers Union of South Africa obo MW Ngedle and 93 Others v Unitrans Fuel and 
Chemical (Pty) Limited [2016] ZACC 28. 
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a protected strike into an unprotected strike, a protected strike remains protected ...’344 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Zondo J did not directly pronounce on whether or not violence during a protected strike will 
rob it of its protected status. It however appears that he enumerated the set of circumstances 
causing a strike to lose its protected status, violence not being one of them. Since employees 
use violence to achieve the authorised purpose of the strike, as argued above, it does not follow 
that by resorting to violence, the strikers have abandoned the authorised purpose of the strike, 
and thus, pursuant to Zondo J’s judgment, the strike does not lose its protection.  
 
Be that as it may, it is still submitted that violent strikes should lose their protection. The 
grounds for such removal should flow from well-established principles of our law. The SCA 
in Comwezi Security Services v Cape Empowerment Trust345 said ‘it is a fundamental principle 
of our law that no man can take advantage of his own wrong’.346 
 
It is trite law that one cannot benefit from their illegal conduct which s 67(8) of the LRA 
ostensibly endorses by removing protection where offences are committed during a strike. Even 
though the legitimate purpose of the strike does not fall away simply because violence is 
involved, strikes should nonetheless lose their protection by virtue of the fact that the strikers 
seek to benefit from illegal conduct as they seek to benefit through the forbidden bolstering of 
their bargaining power through the unlawful use of violence.  
 
A two-stage interdict process is proposed in order to remove the protected status of a strike 
without pushing the strikers to further violence and defiance of the rule of law. 
 
a) Two-stage interdict system  
 
Fergus makes the valid point that interdicting a strike is distinct to interdicting conduct during 
the strike, particularly when that (mis)conduct may well be confined to a small group of striking 
workers.347 From the ‘means’ being distinct from the ‘ends’ discussion above, it stands to 
                                                          
344 Ibid at paras 119–20.  
345 (182/13) [2014] ZASCA 22 (28 March 2014). 
346 Ibid at Para 12. 
347 Fergus Note 27 at 1548. 
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reason that in order to limit the infringement upon the right to strike, the courts could confine 
themselves to interdicting the unlawful component of the strike whilst permitting the strikers 
to pursue the lawful objectives of the strike.  
 
The separation and dichotomising of the lawful and unlawful components of strikes for 
purposes of issuing interdicts may present practical difficulties given the particularly brazen 
violence related to strikes. The idea should however not be readily dismissed. It opens the door 
to considering a two-stage interdict approach where courts could issue an initial interdict 
proscribing the misconduct. This interdict could serve as a form of ultimatum that the 
misconduct cease, failing which an interdict declaring the strike unlawful would be issued 
together with a contempt order where hefty fines would be imposed. This may be useful in 
curbing, not only the intrusion into the right to strike, but in appeasing the workers that the 
courts are cognisant of the structural violence causing them the very frustrations inciting them 
to violence and that the courts are taking steps to mitigate this structural violence. 
 
The exact operations of this system will have to be developed over time and practice. The 
underlying rationale of the approach would be to restore credibility of the courts in the eyes of 
strikers. The courts achieve this by issuing a first interdict in which it makes no 
pronouncements on the purpose of the strike, but merely interdicts the illegal conduct. Only 
when the first interdict is not adhered to, does the court step in and interdict the actual strike 
on the basis that strikers seek to unlawfully benefit from unlawful conduct.  
 
The benefit of the system will be that instead of telling the strikers they have no objectives 
because they resorted to unlawful conduct, a course historically adopted by the apartheid 
government, the court will now be making it clear that the strikers’ objectives are legitimate 
and worthy of protection, however they must refrain from the unlawful acts. The consequence 
will be a less-frustrated proletarian with a lowered disposition towards violence. This will also 
restore faith and respect for the courts and the rule of law. 
 
Integrating these virtues of Ubuntu should be seamless as the vast majority of workers are black 
workers whose upbringing is largely premised on these principles.  
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The words of Wallis JA further resonate with the two-stage interdict suggested as a solution in 
this dissertation. He says:  
 
‘I stress that they were not being asked by the university not to engage in protest action. 
That the university was always willing to accept as legitimate. It was the manner in 
which the right to protest was exercised that gave rise to the university’s 
application.’348  
 
The first stage of the interdict would prohibit the unlawful aspects of the strike whilst 
permitting the strike to continue on the warning that further unlawful conduct would be met 
with an interdict stopping the otherwise legitimate strike coupled with a contempt of court 
sanction and a damages order as though the strike was never protected. The acknowledgement 
of the legitimacy of the strike will ease tensions and frustrations, whilst the possible hefty 
sanctions will act as a deterrence, and together, possibly reduce incidents of strike violence. 
 
Once the strike is declared unprotected then the s 68 remedies become available to victims. 




The chapter demonstrates that members of the union can be held liable for misconduct during 
protected strikes. It has been argued that strikes should lose protection when they turn violent, 
which will open up an array of remedies that strikers are immune to during protected strikes. 
Different options for dismissing strikers who commit misconduct during a strike are discussed, 
including the no fault option of operational requirements. A burning issue is holding unions 
liable for the delict of its members, which was also traversed in the chapter. In the next chapter, 
we deal with statutory remedies applicable to unprotected strikes. 
 
  
                                                          
348 Hotz v UCT Note 341 at para 74. 
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CHAPTER 5: STATUTORY REMEDIES IN TERMS OF THE LRA AND THE 




Victims of unprotected strike are afforded remedies as per s 68 of the LRA. The selection of a 
remedy will depend on the nature of the harm actually incurred. The victim(s) can bring an 
application for an interdict prohibiting the strike, claim compensation for loss linked to the 
strike, and/or enforce the sanction of dismissal if the victim is an employer.  
 
The question that arises is whether these remedies are sufficient to curb strike violence or deter 
participants from continuing with their action which adversely affects other people or their 
property. This chapter investigates and attempts to come up with answers to this question. In 
addition, remedies in terms of the RGA are also investigated with a view to finding a solution 
to the recurring problem of violence during strikes. 
 




Section 68(1)(a) of the LRA bestows upon the Labour Court exclusive jurisdiction to interdict 
any person from participating in an unprotected strike. As discussed in Chapter 2 above, a strike 
that does not comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the LRA, namely 
ss 64 and 65 of the LRA, is an unprotected strike. This means that the employer and/or 
members of the public, such as business owners in the vicinity of the strike, who suffer loss as 
a result of the unprotected strike, may apply for an interdict.349 An interdict is an urgent 
temporary court order restraining wrongful conduct.350 In NCSPCA v Openshaw351 the court 
set out the requirements for obtaining an interdict as follows: 
                                                          
349 J Grogan Workplace Law (2009) 395. 
350 K McCall ‘Interdicts and Damages Claims in Collective Disputes’ in P Benjamin, R Jacobus & C Albertyn (eds) 
Strikes, Lock-outs & Arbitration in South African Law (1989) 41–52. See also Thompson v Voges 1988 (1) SA 691 
(AD) at 711; Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson and others 1996 (4) SA 348 (SCA); and Atkin v Botes unreported 
(566/2010) [2011] ZASCA 12 (9 September 2011). 
351 2008 (5) SA 339 (SCA). See also Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227, Van Deventer v Ivory Sun Trading 
77 (Pty) Ltd 2015 (3) SA 532 (SCA); [2014] ZASCA 169 para 26, and Red Dunes of Africa v Masingita Property 
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‘A prima facie or clear right: what is required here is proof of facts that establish the 
existence of a right in terms of substantive law; A well-grounded apprehension of 
irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted and the ultimate relief is eventually 
granted; Balance of convenience favours the granting of an interim interdict; and the 
applicant has no other satisfactory remedy.’352  
 
Once these factors are established, the courts say that there is no general discretion to refuse 
the relief sought.353 In Hotz v UCT354 the SCA, as per Wallis J, explained that: 
 
‘That is a logical corollary of the court holding that the applicant has suffered an injury 
or has a reasonable apprehension of injury and that there is no similar protection 
against that injury by way of another ordinary remedy. In those circumstances, were 
the court to withhold an interdict that would deny the injured party a remedy for their 
injury, a result inconsistent with the constitutionally protected right of access to courts 
for the resolution of disputes’355  
 
Interdicts have been described as being ‘foundational to the stability of an orderly society’ as 
they ‘ensures the peaceful, regulated and institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes 
without resorting to self-help’ and they are ‘a bulwark against vigilantism, and chaos and 
anarchy’.356 
 
The court in Hotz v UCT went on to explain that the purpose of an interdict is to end conduct 
in breach of the applicant’s right. The court said:  
 
                                                          
Investment Holdings [2015] ZASCA 99 para 19. They were affirmed by the Constitutional Court. Pilane & Another 
v Pilane & Another [2013] ZACC 3; 2013 (4) BCLR 431 (CC) (‘Pilane’) para 38.   
352 Ibid at 347B.  
353 Lester v Ndlambe Municipality & Another 2015 (6) SA 283 (SCA) paras 23–4; United Technical Equipment Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1987 (4) SA 343 (T) at 347F–H. 
354 Note 341.  
355 Ibid at Para 29. Quoted with approval in Rhodes University v Student Representative Council of Rhodes 
University & Others (1937/2016) [2016] ZAECGHC 141; [2017] 1 All SA 617 (ECG) (1 December 2016). 
356 Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank & Another 1999 (12) BCLR 1420 (CC); 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC); 
[1999] ZACC 16 para 22, citing with approval Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1997 (11) BCLR 1624 (LC) at 
1644F–1645A. 
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‘The applicant invokes the aid of the court to order the respondent to desist from such 
conduct and, if the respondent does not comply, to enforce its order by way of the 
sanctions for contempt of court.’357 
  
If a strike or conduct in the furtherance, or in contemplation, of a strike is characterised by 
violence it will not be conducive to orderly collective bargaining. In this regard, the remedy of 
interdict can serve to remedy the situation and to preserve orderly collective bargaining. The 
LRA does not specify who may use this remedy.358 In Growthpoint Properties Ltd v SA 
Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others,359 the court held that members 
of the public can also obtain interdicts when affected by noisy pickets.360 In SA Post Office Ltd 
(SAPO) v TAS Appointment and Management Services CC and Others,361 the temporary 
employment services staff working at SAPO were about to embark on an unprotected strike 
when SAPO applied for an interdict prohibiting such strike. In deciding whether SAPO had 
locus standi to bring the application, the Labour Court found that SAPO had locus standi on 
the basis that the strike was unprotected and that it infringed SAPO’s legal rights.362 The 
interdict was granted.363  
 
a)  The efficacy of interdicts in South Africa 
 
The next issue to be discussed is the effectiveness of interdicts to stop unlawful conduct during 
industrial action/strikes as experience has shown that interdicts are often disregarded at will by 
unions and members or participants.364 Examples drawn from case law indicate that interdicts 
are not really respected in South Africa. The court in Betafence noted that employees frequently 
disregard interdicts prohibiting strikes simply because they do not like them.365 In Food and 
Allied Workers Union on behalf of Kapesi and Others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon 
Salt River366 the strike was characterised by gruesome violence. The police intervened and 
                                                          
357 Hotz v UCT note 341 Para 36.  
358 EM Tenza note 303 at 109.  
359 (2010) 31 ILJ 2539 (KZD).  
360 Ibid at 2545j.  
361 (2012) 33 ILJ 1958 (LC).  
362 At 1964h.  
363 At 1865a.  
364 See EM Tenza Note 303 at 111. See also Rycroft Note 27 at 5. B Hepple, R le Roux & SA Sciarra Laws against 
Strikes: The South African Experience in an International and Comparative Perspective 1 ed (2016) 112.  
365 Betafence Note 83 at para 54.  
366 (2012) 33 ILJ 1779 (LAC).  
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failed to calm the situation. The court issued an interdict prohibiting the strike and the violence, 
the death threats issued to management and non-striking employees. 
 
In In2Food (Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union and Others,367 the employer 
successfully applied for an interdict prohibiting an unprotected and violent strike the employees 
had embarked on. The employees persisted with the violent strike despite the interdict. The 
trial court held the union in contempt of court and imposed a fined of R500 000. However, the 
LAC overturned this decision.368 It held that the specificities of the interdict, clear of ambiguity 
as to what is required of the parties interdicted, must be examined in order to determine whether 
they were complied with.369   
 
In Pikitup Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd (Pikitup) v South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU) and Others370 SAMWU and its members ignored an interdict that prohibited them 
from embarking on an unprotected strike. Union officials issued public statements that 
supported the blatant disregard of the court order and supporting the continuation of the strike. 
In light of this contempt, the sanction issued by the Labour Court was a suspended fine for 
SAMWU of R80 000, suspended for 24 months on condition that SAMWU was not found 
guilty of the same offence within that period. SAMWU’s general secretary was also fined 
R10 000 suspended for the same period and conditions as the union. 
 
A failure to comply with a ruling by a court is contempt of court.371 This is not only an offence 
but a breach of a foundational value in the Constitution which states that South Africa is 
founded on the rule of law.372 The rule of law entails that court decisions must be respected. In 
Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality373 Nkabinde J held that:  
 
                                                          
367 (2013) 34 ILJ 2589 (LC).  
368 Food and Allied Workers Union v In2food (Pty) Ltd (2014) 35 ILJ 2767 (LAC).  
369 Ibid at 2771f–j.  
370 (J2362/15) [2016] ZALCJHB 149 (19 April 2016).  
371 Other examples from case law where interdicts were not obeyed include Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Montecasino v Future of SA Workers Union & Others (2012) 33 ILJ 998 (LC); Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v 
Mouthpiece Workers Union [2002] 1 BLLR 84 (LC); Betafence South Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa & Others (C194/2016) [2016] ZALCCT 33 (15 September 2016).  
372 S 1 of the Constitution.  
373 2015 (6) BCLR 711 (CC).  
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‘The rule of law, a foundational value of the Constitution, requires that the dignity and 
authority of the courts be upheld. This is crucial, as the capacity of the courts to carry 
out their functions depends upon it. As the Constitution commands, orders and 
decisions issued by a court bind all persons to whom and organs of state to which they 
apply, and no person or organ of state may interfere, in any manner, with the 
functioning of the courts. It follows from this that disobedience towards court orders or 
decisions risks rendering our courts impotent and judicial authority a mere mockery. 
The effectiveness of court orders or decisions is substantially determined by the 
assurance that they will be enforced.’374 
 
The incessant disobedience of court orders has varied and undesirable consequences as this 
undermines the rule of law. In Modise and Others v Steve's Spar Blackheath375 in upholding 
the dismissal of strikers who had failed to comply with an interdict prohibiting a strike, the 
court held: 
 
‘It is becoming distressingly obvious that court orders are, by employers and employees 
alike, not invariably treated with the respect they ought to command. … Obedience to 
a court order is foundational to a state based on the rule of law.’376 
  
Indeed a society that allows such disobedience of court orders would ‘in no time be a society 
of chaos and lawlessness.’377  
 
For a contempt to exist certain requirements must be complied with. These include: 
a) There must have been a court order in existence;  
b) The order must have been properly served on the other parties bound by it; and 
c) There must have been non-compliance with the order.378 
 
                                                          
374 Ibid para 1.  
375 (2000) 21 ILJ 519 (LAC).  
376 Ibid para 120.  
377 North West Star (Pty) Ltd (Under Judicial Management) v Serobatse and another (2005) 26 ILJ 56 (LAC) para 
17.  
378 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA).  
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The legal effects of a failure to comply with a court order include the imposition of criminal 
sanctions such as a fine,379 imprisonment, or suspended imprisonment with conditions.380 
 
In North West Star (Pty) Ltd (Under Judicial Management) v Serobatse and Another381 the 
court expressed similar sentiments in saying:  
 
‘The correct principle is that, if a court has issued an order against you and you are 
unhappy with it, you must take that decision to a court higher than the one that issued 
such order and which has competent appellate or review jurisdiction and seek to have 
such order set aside. If there is no such court, for example, where there is no appeal or 
review available against that court or against such order or if the court which issued 
the order is the court of final jurisdiction in such matters or is the highest court in the 
land, then you have no choice but must simply comply with the order. A person cannot 
say: “I don’t like this court order; it is wrong; therefore I will not comply with it.” If 
we want to deepen our democracy, promote the rule of law, discourage self-help and 
encourage those who have disputes to take them to the courts of the land and not to 
seek to resolve them through physical fights or violence, the whole society must frown 
upon anyone who disobeys an order of court or who, either by word or deed, 
encourages or incites another or others to disobey an order of court.’382 
 
In Dunlop Mixing and Technical Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) obo Nganezi and Others383 NUMSA and its members 
embarked on a protected strike over a wage dispute. The strike degenerated into violence where 
there was damage to property and strikers violently confronting management and employer 
representatives. The employer successfully approached the Labour Court for an interdict 
prohibiting the unlawful conduct of the employees. Ignoring the interdict, the strikers continued 
with their misconduct.  
 
                                                          
379 See note 23 above.  
380 A Rycroft ‘Being Held in Contempt for Non-compliance with a Court Interdict: In2Food (Pty) Ltd v Food & 
Allied Workers Union & others (2013) 34 ILJ 2589 (LC)’ 2499 at 2501. See also SA Police Service v Police & Civil 
Rights Union & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2611 (LC). 
381 (2005) 26 ILJ 56 (LAC).  
382 Ibid para [18].  
383 Note 277. 
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In addition, the credibility of the courts will be affected. In S v Mamabolo (ETV and Others 
intervening)384 the Constitutional Court, referring to the authority and credibility of the courts, 
held: 
 
‘… Having no constituency, no purse and no sword, the Judiciary must rely on moral 
authority. Without such authority it cannot perform its vital function as the interpreter 
of the Constitution, the arbiter in disputes between organs of State and, ultimately, as 




‘… In the final analysis it is the people who have to believe in the integrity of their 
Judges. Without such trust, the Judiciary cannot function properly; and where the 
Judiciary cannot function properly the rule of law must die.’386  
 
In addition, disobedience of interdicts distorts collective bargaining. The insistence on ignoring 
interdicts and perpetuating unlawful conduct during collective bargaining shifts the focus from 
economic bargaining to violent duress, with the result that the issue shifts from the subject-
matter of the strike to the violence itself, and the employer capitulates to the demands of the 
strikers not as a result of the economic pressure, but due to the desire to end the violence. In 
Food and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Kapesi and Others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Blue 
Ribbon Salt River387 the remarks expressed this notion thus:  
 
‘Strikes that are marred by this type of violent and unruly conduct are extremely 
detrimental to the legal foundations upon which labour relations in this country rest. 
The aim of a strike is to persuade the employer through the peaceful withholding of 
work to agree to their demands. As already indicated, although a certain degree of 
                                                          
384 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC). 
385 Ibid para 16.  
386 Ibid paras 18–9.  
387 (2010) 31 ILJ 1654 (LC). 
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disruptiveness is expected, it is certainly not acceptable to force an employer through 
violent and criminal conduct to accede to their demands.’388 
 
b) Absence of an alternative remedy 
 
Applicants for an interdict are typically required to state that, short of dismissal, there is no 
available alternative remedy other than seeking an urgent interdict. But even the interdict is no 
longer a viable remedy as it is not worth the paper it is written on.389  
 
The next question is how best to remedy the situation and restore the credibility and weight of 
interdicts. Ngcukaitobi390 suggests the answer lies beyond legal institutions, but are squarely 
in the political arena. He put it thus:  
 
‘… The prevalence of violence in industrial action caused by this instability means that 
there remains a limited role that the law can play. The solution then becomes one of a 
political nature.’391  
 
Van Niekerk J expressed similar views by saying:  
 
‘… When citizens or a group of citizens decide that their interests are better advanced 
by flouting the law, then there is very little to say about the role and perspective of 
courts ...’392  
 
Myburgh also opines that there is little the courts can do because:  
 
                                                          
388 Ibid para 6. See also Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & 
Others (2006) 27 ILJ 2681 (LC) para 30. And Martin Brassey SC ‘Fixing the Laws that Govern the Labour Market’ 
(2012) 33 ILJ 1 at 16. 
389 Myburgh ‘The failure to obey interdicts prohibiting strikes and violence: The implications for labour law and 
the rule of law’ Contemporary Labour Law Vol. 23 No.1 August 2013 at 5.  
390 T Ngcukaitobi Note 35. 
391 Ibid at 858.  
392 J van Niekerk Keynote address at the 2012 SASLAW national conference (‘Marikana: The perspective of the 
Labour Court’). 
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‘With its orders already being disobeyed, the Labour Court may well be setting itself 
up for failure if it now seeks to impose novel legal solutions.’393 
 
This does not, however, imply that courts should fold their arms and wait for others to do 
something about the problem. Some of the obvious things the courts can do is to heavily 
castigate transgressors, as is evidenced in the Transport SA (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport and Allied 
Workers Union and Others394 where the court said:  
 
‘This court is always open to those who seek the protection of the right to strike. But 
those who commit acts of criminal and other misconduct during the course of strike 
action in breach of an order of this court must accept in future to be subjected to the 
severest penalties that this court is entitled to impose.’395 
 
This will include awarding costs against unions. It is submitted that a solution may lie in the 
manner of treating the strikers. It is suggested that courts adopt a less antagonistic approach 
towards litigants, even if it is only perceived. This stems from the structural discussion in 
Chapter 3. The approach and language chosen by the courts has given workers the impression 
that there is a general trend of seeking ways to place stumbling blocks in the path of the workers 
on their journey to economic and social emancipation through, among other, collective 
bargaining and striking.  
 
The dictum in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd and Others,396 
demonstrates the perceived antagonistic stance adopted by the courts. In this case workers were 
dismissed following participation in a protected strike. The Appellate Division, as it then was, 
held that the dismissals of workers were justified because the strike had no longer been 
functional to collective bargaining.397   
 
‘The longer a strike lasts, the more the financial stress on those concerned, the greater 
the incentive for continued bargaining with a view to compromise and settlement. 
                                                          
393 Myburgh ‘The failure to obey interdicts prohibiting strikes and violence: The implications for labour law and 
the rule of law’ Contemporary Labour Law Vol. 23 No.1 August 2013 at 6.  
394 (2011) 32 ILJ 1722 (LC). 
395 Ibid para 9.  
396 (1996) 17 ILJ 455 (A). 
397 Ibid at 464. 
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Parties’ relative bargaining strengths and weaknesses ultimately determine the lengths 
to which they are prepared to go.’398 
 
Workers may perceive such decisions as the Appellate Division blatantly turning a blind eye 
to their plight and grievances whilst protecting the interests of the employer. The court found 
it preferable to perpetuate the structural violence and relegated the employees to the ranks of 
the unemployed. This was in 1996, when the country was still in transition and the new 
constitutional ethos was still in its infancy, but the roots of the perceived bias reached further 
into history. In Food and Beverage Workers Union and Others v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) 
Ltd,399 the court found that the purpose of a strike was getting the employer to the negotiating 
table. The employer offered to negotiate during the strike but was mocked. This was after the 
employees removed frozen carcasses into the sun. The court said: 
 
‘We are of the view that the strike action was fair insofar as it was directed to compel 
the respondent to re-open negotiations. Having achieved this any further justification 
for the strike ceased. By refusing to negotiate with the respondent the employees’ 
conduct became unfair and unreasonable. By conduct they waived their claim to 
equitable relief and brought their present predicament upon themselves.’400 
 
Rycroft401 correctly points out that the court concluded that the strike should end the moment 
the strike achieved the desired effect. That moment was when the employer was no longer 
intransigent and had become amenable to negotiating. There was however no offer to settle.402 
The court ignored the fact that collective bargaining is about power, and not only when power 
is in the hands of the employer, but even when it is seized by the employees.403 It is noteworthy 
that Rycroft’s criticism of the judgment downplays to some extent the underlying issue of 
structural violence and attributes the decision to a mere ‘failing to understand’. He writes ‘The 
court failed to understand that a strike is ultimately about power, even if it is called at a moment 
when the employer is particularly vulnerable.’404 The worker, who has been at the receiving 
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399 (1990) 11 ILJ 47 (LAC). 
400 Ibid at 51e–f.  
401 Rycroft Note 28 at 821. 
402 Ibid at 824.  
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end of structural violence, is more likely to assume that the LAC is too competent to fail to 
arrive at such a comprehension of collective bargaining, but rather that the court’s decision was 
a deliberate thwarting of the aspirations of the proletarian, being overwhelmingly black 
Africans, as was the general trend at the time. The court would be perceived as deliberately 
taking up the role of protecting the status quo and firmly placing power in the hands of one 
party in the workplace, regardless of the obviously detrimental consequences thereof. 
 
A further example of how the courts may be perceived as antagonistic by the proletarian is in 
the manner that strikes are declared unprotected as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Over two decades into our democracy the negative perceptions of the courts may, like other 
remnants of the apartheid regime, are still be firmly embedded in the minds of the people, 
especially those at grass roots level. It is not enough to sit back and assume that the perception 
will change without deliberate efforts; perhaps it will through the effluxion of time, but that 
would take too long. The courts must be more proactive in winning back the trust of the 
workers. One opportunity of so doing is to implement the two-stage interdict system which 
steers away from telling workers that their strike has no purpose, towards an approach that 
demonstrates to the workers that the courts are alive to the legitimacy of their grievances, and 
are only prohibiting the strike because of the unlawful conduct associated with the strike. 
 
2.2 Just and equitable compensation 
 
As discussed above, s 67 of the LRA shields strike organisers and striking employees who take 
part in a protected strike from the common law civil and delictual liability flowing from the 
strike.405 Those who participate in an unprotected do not enjoy this immunity, both unions and 
union members can be held liable under s 68 on condition that they participated in an 
unprotected strike or took steps in the furtherance of such strike. The LRA is clear that the loss 
must be attributable to a strike or conduct in the furtherance of a strike.406 Case law407 also 
expands on this and adds that there must be proof that the applicant suffered loss, that such loss 
                                                          
405 S 67(2) reads:  
‘(2) A person does not commit a defect or a breach of contract by taking part in— 
(a) a protected strike or a protected lock-out; or 
(b) any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike or a protected lock-out.’  
406 S 68(b). 
407 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouthpiece Workers Union [2002] 1 BLLR 84 (LC). 
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occurred during an unprotected action, that there is a connection between the loss and the 
unprotected strike and that the defendant participated in the unprotected strike or committed 
acts in furtherance or in contemplation of a strike.408  
 
Once these requirements are proven, the court, in exercising its discretion, will consider the 
following factors in determining what is ‘just and equitable’ compensation to award as per 
s 68(1)(b)(i) to (iv):409 
 
a) Reported cases 
 
The LRA does not specify what constitutes ‘just and equitable’ compensation. It is also not 
clear from the Act whether ‘just and equitable’ compensation replaces the common-law remedy 
of damages.410 Assistance is sought from case law in this regard.411 
 
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouthpiece Workers Union412 the employer’s claim was 
for the amount of approximately R15 million in respect of losses arising from an unprotected 
strike. The court held that ‘just and equitable’ simply means that the award for compensation 
must be fair. On the facts, the court found that although the strike was of a relatively short 
duration, the union had made no attempt to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV of the 
                                                          
408 Ibid at 2042g–h.  
409  ‘(b) to order the payment of just and equitable compensation for any loss attributable to the strike or lock-
out, or conduct, having regard to— 
(i) whether— 
1. attempts were made to comply with the provisions of this Chapter and the extent of those 
attempts; 
2. the strike or lock-out or conduct was premeditated; 
3. the strike or lock-out, or conduct was in response to unjustified conduct by another party to the 
dispute; and 
4. there was compliance with an order granted in terms of paragraph (a); 
(ii) the interests of orderly collective bargaining; 
(iii) the duration of the strike or lock-out or conduct; and 
(iv) the financial position of the employer, trade union or employees respectively.’ 
410 According to common law delictual claims, the plaintiff will ordinarily be entitled to an award equal to the 
loss claimed. However, the LRA gives the court discretion to decide what a ‘just and equitable’ amount would 
be. As seen in this chapter, the courts have awarded just and equitable amounts that were meagre compared 
to the actual loss suffered. 
411 See EM Tenza Note 303 at 118. 
412 Note 371.  
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LRA and that the strike was premeditated. The court awarded only R100 000 in compensation 
payable by the Union in monthly instalments of R5 000.413 
 
In Mangaung Municipality v SAMWU,414 the court made it clear that a union can be held 
liable for the conduct of its members. It held:  
 
‘Where a trade union has a collective bargaining relationship with an employer, and 
its members embark on an unprotected strike action and the trade union becomes aware 
of such unprotected strike and is requested to intervene and fails to do so without just 
cause, such trade union is liable in terms of section 68(1)(b) of the Act to compensate 
the employer who suffers losses due to such unprotected strike. Similarly, if a trade 
union elects to delegate the responsibility to resolve the strike to its shop stewards 
employed by the employer facing an unprotected strike, and such shop stewards fail to 
discharge the same obligation that the trade union has, the trade union is also liable to 
compensate the employer for any losses that it has suffered as a result of such strike.’415 
 
The court took cognisance of item 6 of the Code of Good Practice in Schedule 8 of the LRA, 
which requires that the trade union heed the employer’s call to discuss the employees’ 
participation in an unprotected strike with the view of preventing such strike and, as such, the 
refusal by the trade union to heed such call amounts to a violation of item 6 the Code of Good 
Practice and the liability to compensate the employer for losses arises.416 The employer’s losses 
amounted to approximately R270 000 but it was awarded ‘just and equitable’ compensation of 
R25 000. 
 
In Algoa Bus Company v SATAWU and Others417 the employer’s claim for compensation was 
R1.4 million arising out of an unprotected strike. The court held that the defendants were liable 
because the strike was unprocedural, premediated and directly caused the employer’s loss.418 
The court found that it was ‘just and equitable’ for the union to compensate the employer for 
                                                          
413 Ibid at 2045i.  
414 (2003) 24 ILJ 405 (LC).  
415 Ibid at 415j–416ab.  
416 Ibid. Item 6(1) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal to the LRA. See also SR van Jaarsveld, JD Fourie, & 
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R1.4 million payable in monthly instalments of R5 280 by the union and R214.50 by every 
member of the union.419   
 
In Professional Transport and Allied Workers Union obo Khoza and Others v New Kleinfontein 
Gold Mine (Pty) Ltd420 the court found that the strike was unprotected because the issue in 
dispute was regulated by a peace clause in a collective agreement entered into by the employer 
and the majority union at the employer’s workplace, NUM. The PTAWU and its members had 
engaged in this unprotected strike which had caused the employer’s loss.  
 
The employer placed evidence before the court to the effect that, but for the strike, 
approximately 32.52 kilograms of gold would have been mined which would have sold for 
R426 000 per kilogram. After operational costs, the employer’s loss totalled just below 
R10 million. The union could not contest these computations. The employer offered that it 
would accept 30% of the damage as compensation. 
 
The court considered the precedent in Algoa but refused to follow such precedent after placing 
heavy reliance on the fact that the employer had not advised the union, either prior to or during 
the unprotected strike, of its intention to institute a damages claim as per s 68(1)(b) of the LRA. 
The court, in considering the union’s financial statements and its ability to repay any 
compensation, held: 
 
‘While unions cannot escape liability simply because it would be onerous financially, 
it is important that compensation claims are not used as a device to cripple a union’s 
ability to operate or to deal it a terminal blow. While I am reluctant to allow a union 
to escape the consequences of pursuing the unprotected strike, I am also concerned that 
the issue of liability for compensation under s68(1)(b) was only raised with it after the 
event, at a stage when PTAWU could not have done anything to minimise its exposure 
to such liability. Had it been made aware of the potential liability faced at an earlier 
stage that might well have concentrated the minds of the union leadership to consider 
more seriously the wisdom of persisting with the strike action.’421 
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The court concluded that it would not be ‘just and equitable’ to award any compensation to the 
employer. The court’s decision to superimpose this new requirement into s 68(1)(b) seems 
dubious. It amounts to legislating through interpretation and creates a precedent that liability 
will only be incurred once there has been a notice of intention to take legal action against 




Participation in an unprotected strike constitutes a breach of the employment contract.422 
Section 68(5) of the LRA reads: 
 
‘(5) Participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of this Chapter, 
or conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of that strike, may constitute a fair reason 
for dismissal. In determining whether or not the dismissal is fair, the Code of Good 
Practice: Dismissal in Schedule 8 must be taken into account.’ 
 
According the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal in Schedule 8, dismissals must be procedural 
and substantively fair. The requirement for fairness is in accordance with the constitutional 
right to fair labour practice and the preservation of job security.423 
 
a) Substantive fairness 
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Tek Corporation Ltd and Others424 the LAC said 
‘the illegality of the strike is not “a magic wand which when raised renders the dismissal of 
strikers fair”.’ The employer bears the onus of proving the fairness of the dismissal. 
 
In Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd v Adams and Others425 the court found that dismissal was too 
harsh where employees, engaged in an unprotected strike, genuinely believed that the strike 
was protected. The court considered the following factors: 
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(a) the seriousness of the contravention of this Act; 
(b) attempts made to comply with this Act; and 
(c) whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by the employer. 
 
In NUMSA and Others v Pro Roof Cape (Pty) Ltd426 the court found that a significant factor to 
consider is the extent of the harm suffered by the employer.  
 
b) Procedural fairness 
 
The employer must comply with procedural requirements before dismissing employees 
engaged in an unprotected strike. Item 6(2) of the Code provides that: 
 
‘Prior to dismissal the employer should, at the earliest opportunity, contact a trade 
union official to discuss the course of action it intends to adopt. The employer should 
issue an ultimatum in clear and unambiguous terms that should state what is required 
of the employees and what sanction will be imposed if they do not comply with the 
ultimatum. The employees should be allowed sufficient time to reflect on the ultimatum 
and respond to it, either by complying with it or rejecting it. If the employer cannot 
reasonably be expected to extend these steps to the employees in question, the employer 
may dispense with them.’  
 
The court in Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (“AMCU”) and Others v 
Australian Laboratory Services (Pty) Ltd427 explained the interplay between item 6(1), which 
addresses non-compliance with statutory requirements for the commencement of a strike, and 
item 6(2), which deals with the employer’s response to the unprocedural strike. The court said: 
 
‘Item 6, attempts to encapsulate important aspects of the respective conduct of the 
employer and employee parties in the course of the strike which must be considered in 
deciding whether any ensuing dismissals were substantively fair or not. Item 6 (1) is 
concerned with the extent to which strikers, and by implication any union they belong 
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to, have departed from the legal requirements for protected strike action and how they 
conducted themselves during the strike itself. Item 6 (2) is concerned with the extent to 
which the employer party gave strikers a reasonable opportunity to abandon their 
unprotected action. Unfortunately, the object of the guidelines has often been lost sight 
of by parties engaged in unprotected strike conflicts and there is a tendency for both 
parties to focus on whether the employer formally complied with item 6 (2) since this is 
often the easiest factual question to evaluate and is one of the important requisites for 
a fair dismissal of unprotected strikers. Similarly, there is a tendency to ignore the 
extent to which workers or the union party makes any meaningful efforts to end the 
unprotected strike, because item 6 (1) tends to emphasise the non-compliance with the 
statutory requirements for commencing strike action. In focusing in a checklist fashion 
on these factors, an underlying concern of item 6, which is to evaluate how both parties 
dealt in good faith with resolving the unprotected strike action is sometimes lost sight 
of.’   
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) v CBI Electric African Cables428 
the LAC held that in addition to item 6, item 7 should also be considered.429 The court further 
held that item 6 expresses in general terms some factors to be considered but is not an 
exhaustive list. The consideration of the fairness of strikes is much broader than the factors 
enumerated in item 6.430 
 
In the recent case of SACCAWU obo Mokebe and Others v Pick 'n Pay Retailers431 61 
employees were dismissed for engaging in an unprotected strike for about one hour on 
24 September 2010. The strike notice indicated that the strike would start at 19:00. The 
employees started the strike at 15:00. The dismissed employees’ shifts ended at 16:00 for some, 
and at 16:30 for others. The union contended that the dismissal was too harsh considering the 
                                                          
428 [2014] 1 BLLR 31 (LAC).  
429 Ibid at 36.  
‘Item 7. Guidelines in cases of dismissal for misconduct.—  
Any person who is determining whether dismissal for misconduct is unfair should consider – Whether or not 
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unprotected strike only lasted for about an hour. The employer contended that it suffered 
considerable harm due to the strike since the strikers purposefully chose to strike during a very 
busy hour during heritage day and about 100 customers abandoned their trolleys.432 Further, 
the strikers were already on a final written warning for similar misconduct and were warned 
by management that the strike would be unprotected if they started at 15:00, but the strikers 
went ahead regardless. They showed no remorse thus rendering a continued working 
relationship intolerable.433  
 
The Labour Court found that the dismissals were both substantively and procedurally fair. The 
LAC, as per Kathree-Setiloane AJA, found that even though the employer attempted to 
dissuade the employees from embarking on the strike, it failed to issue an ultimatum despite 
having been aware from 12:30 on 24 September 2010 that the employees intended embarking 
on the strike at 15:00. The LAC, in dismissing the argument that there was no obligation to 
issue an ultimatum where the employer had informed the employees that the strike would be 
unprotected, quoted Modise v Steve’s Spar Blackheath434 where the court said: 
 
‘The purpose of an ultimatum is … to give the workers an opportunity to reflect on their 
conduct, digest issues and, if need be, seek advice before making the decision whether 
to heed the ultimatum or not.’435 
 
Kathree-Setiloane AJA explained that ‘an ultimatum is as much a means of avoiding a 
dismissal as a prerequisite to affecting one’436 and that it has a bearing on both procedural and 
substantive fairness as it is aimed at avoiding dismissal.437 The learned judge found that:   
 
‘It is unlikely, on the probabilities, that they would have proceeded to participate in the 
unprotected strike had they been furnished with a written ultimatum which expressly 
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spelt out the consequences of doing so, such as no payment for the duration of the strike 
and disciplinary action that could result in the termination of their services.’438 
 
Further, the company convened a disciplinary hearing where only the union officials and shop 
stewards were permitted to participate and did not give the employees a chance to submit 
written submissions as to why they should not be dismissed despite an undertaking by the 
employer to afford the employees such an opportunity. Kathree-Setiloane AJA found this to be 
procedurally unfair. 
 
Kathree-Setiloane AJA further found that the final written warning issued to the employees 
was not for a similar offence as committed 24 September 2010. The company disciplinary code 
recommends a written warning for the offence committed on 24 September 2010. The strikers 
who were on a final written warning on 24 September 2010 were dismissed, whilst those who 
were not on a final written warning, were issued with a written warning instead of dismissal. 
Kathree-Setiloane AJA ultimately found that the dismissals were procedurally and 
substantively unfair and reinstated the employees with back pay. 
  
The first criticism that could be levelled against this judgment is that it did not answer the 
question put before the court, that is, could a reasonable decision-maker have arrived at the 
same decision that the commissioner arrived at.439 Kathree-Setiloane AJA just simply replaced 
the decision of the court a quo with what she believed should have been the correct decision.  
 
The second criticism is levelled against her ostensibly draconian approach to the item 6(2) 
procedural requirement. It is ironic that Kathree-Setiloane AJA criticised the employer of 
inflexibility in the application of its disciplinary hearing procedures, and then went on to adopt 
a very draconian stance that a ‘written’ ultimatum must be issued to the employees for them to 
assimilate and arrive at an informed choice as to whether or not to carry on with the strike. The 
legislature itself adopted a flexible approach by not insisting on a written ultimatum. Item 6(2), 
which Kathree-Setiloane AJA seems to have ignored, states that ‘…If the employer cannot 
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reasonably be expected to extend these steps to the employees in question, the employer may 
dispense with them.’ 
 
It is not contended that the employer could not have been expected to issue a written ultimatum, 
but rather that there need not be a strict requirement of a written ultimatum, and that each case 
should be considered on its merits. In this case, the employees were aware that they would be 
disciplined for unlawful industrial action. This is from their knowledge of the employer’s 
disciplinary code, and because the employer had previously issued final written warnings for 
unlawful industrial action. On 24 September 2010, management informed the employees that 
their intended strike would be ‘illegal’. They were well aware of the contents of the strike 
notice and that they were legally obliged to abide by it. On those facts, the employees could 
not have expected anything other than to be disciplined, which expectation flowed from the 
entirety of the circumstances, particularly the conduct of the employer.  
 
Kathree-Setiloane AJA’s opinion that the employees would not have embarked on the strike 
had they been issued with a written ultimatum is inconsistent with the facts. The employees 
embarked on the unprotected strike not because they were not aware of the consequences of 
their actions, a written ultimatum would not have informed them of anything they were not 
already well aware of. A more realistic explanation is that the employees embarked on the 
strike because they were acting defiantly, not only towards the employer, but also towards the 
rule of law. Excusing the strikers of liability based on the absence of a written warning under 
such circumstances is tantamount to condoning the flouting of the rule of law. It is thus 
submitted that the employer fulfilled its item 6(2) requirement and the method of fulfilling that 
requirement, whether verbal or written, is neither here nor there. Further, it is trite that the 
courts must give effect to substance, rather than form.440 The narrow approach adopted by 
Kathree-Setiloane AJA violates this century-long principle of our law.441 The question the 
court should ask is simply whether or not the employees were aware that the employer was 
averse to their planned unlawful course of action and that the employer intended taking action 
against them should they proceed with the unlawful course of action. The onus being on the 
                                                          
440 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd (27/10) [2010] ZASCA 168; 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA); 
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employer to ensure that the employees are aware of such. How they came to that knowledge, 
with respect, is superfluous.   
 
The basic requirement is that the employer should give the employee an opportunity to state 
his/her side of the story, in accordance with the audi alteram partem principle.442 The employee 
may use the opportunity to successfully dissuade the employer from terminating the 
employment contract.443 The employer will usual convene a disciplinary hearing for purposes 
of giving the employee an opportunity to challenge evidence and present evidence in his/her 
own defence. The process during, and leading up to, the disciplinary hearing must be fair, 
unless the accused employee waives the right to a hearing.444 
 
3  Liability in terms of the RGA 
 
The preamble to the Regulation of Gatherings Act445 (‘the RGA’) stipulates that the purpose 
of the RGA is to regulate the liability of offenders during a public gathering. It was promulgated 
to protect and promote the constitutional right to freedom of assembly.446 It came into operation 
on 15 November 1996. As such, it is a product of a new constitutional era. It also promotes 
other constitutional rights such as freedom of opinion,447 freedom of expression,448 freedom of 
association,449 and the right to make political choices and campaign for a political cause.450  
 
Of particular importance for the purpose of this study is s 11 of the RGA which provides as 
follows: 
 
‘(1)  If any riot damage occurs as a result of— 
(a) a gathering, every organisation on behalf of or under the auspices of 
which that gathering is held, or, if not so held, the convener; 
                                                          
442 Transport & General Workers Union & Others v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 968 (LC) at 979e. 
443 Paper Printing & Allied Workers Union & Others v Solid Doors (Pty) Ltd (2001) ILJ 292 (IC) at 293b. See also 
Modise & Others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath note 375 at 551f. 
444 National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Elm Street Plastics t/a ADV Plastics (note 67, Chapter 2) at 
338A–D. 
445 Act 205 of 1993. 
446 S 17 of the Constitution.  
447 S 15(1). 
448 S 16(1). 
449 S 18. 
450 S 19(1). 
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(b)  a demonstration, every person participating in such demonstration, shall 
subject to subsection (2), be jointly and severally liable for that riot 
damage as a jointly wrongdoer contemplated in Chapter II of the 
Apportionment of Damages Act, 1956 (Act 34 of 1956), together with any 
other person who is liable therefor in terms of this subsection.’451 
 
The definition of gathering452 is broad enough to include any march, demonstration, protest, 
rally or picket in a public street or other public place involving more than 15 people.453 The 
RGA, in s 11, concerns itself with the legal ramifications flowing from damage caused during 
such gathering. As a result of s 11, unions are exposed to potential claims for riot damages454 
whenever they organise strikes that involve more than 15 people and they choose to picket in 
a public place.455 
 
The legislature has not provided a definition of ‘picket’. According to commentators, it may 
be defined as a—  
 
‘public expression by employees, who are already on strike, of their grievances in order 
to make their grievances known to the general public and other relevant constituencies; 
and to solicit support for their cause from the public and those constituencies’.456  
 
                                                          
451 S 11 of the RGA. 
452 ‘as meaning any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or on any public road as 
defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act 29 of 1989), or any other public place or premises wholly or partly open 
to the air  
(a) at which the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of ally government, political party or political 
organization, whether or not that party or organization is registered in terms of any applicable law, are 
discussed, attacked, criticized, promoted, or propagated; or 
(b) held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any person, or to mobilize or demonstrate support 
for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions of any person or body of persons or 
institution, including any government, administration or governmental institution.’ 
453 Tenza Note 303 at 90. See also M Wallis ‘Now You Foresee It, Now You Don't — SATAWU v Garvas & Others’, 
33 ILJ (Juta) 2257 (2012) at 2259. 
454 S 1 of the RGA defines Riot damage as: 
‘Any loss suffered as a result of any injury to or the death of any person, or any damage to or destruction of 
any property, caused directly or indirectly by, and immediately before, during, or after, the holding of a 
gathering.’ 
455 Tenza and Wallis Note 453. 
456 JV du Plessis & MA Fouché A Practical Guide to Labour Law 7 ed (2012) 392; AJ van der Walt, R le Roux & A 
Govindjee Labour Law in Context (2012) 213.  
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With this definition, it is apparent that strikes that include pickets with such pickets taking 
place in public place, including public roads, will fall to be regulated by the RGA. In that case, 
the LRA may cease to regulate the picket and the strikers will have to comply with the 
provisions of the RGA. Section 12 of the RGA provides for the requirements of a valid notice, 
such as informing authorities of an impending gathering at a particular public place. The 
organisers of the strike are therefore required to comply with these provisions.  
 
With the proliferation of violent strikes and protest action in the country, one would have 
expected an equal proliferation of litigation based on the RGA but that has not been the case. 
Litigation came in the form of the locus classicus discussed next: 
 




On 16 May 2006 the SATAWU held a protest march in the Cape Town City Bowl as part of a 
protracted strike in the security sector by members of SATAWU. The strike attracted 
widespread attention for, inter alia, the violence involved which the union’s provincial 
secretary described as being characterised by a high level of acrimony. Approximately 50 
people lost their lives whilst many others suffered bodily injuries. There was rampant damage 
to property, including the looting of stores. The resulting damage was estimated to be in the 
region of R11.5 million. Some of the victims brought claims against SATAWU on the basis of 
s 11(1) of the RGA.458 
 
a) Direct attack 
 
SATAWU did not bring a direct constitutional challenge against s 11(1). Wallis suggests that 
s 11 is vulnerable to a constitutional attack on the grounds that the victim(s) of the riot damage 
only has/have to prove a connection between the damage incurred and the gathering in 
question, thus requiring a no fault liability.459 Further, considering that the definition of riot 
                                                          
457 (2012) 33 ILJ 1593 (CC). 
458 Ibid paras 9 – 20. 
459 See also PAK le Roux ‘The Rights and Obligations of Trade Unions: Recent Decisions Clarify Some Limits to 
Both’ (2012) 22 CLL 31 at 32.  
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damage is worded so broadly to encapsulate ‘any’ loss, the potential damages that the union 
may be liable for could potentially be substantial. Wallis suggests that this may be at odds with 
s 17 of the Constitution, which reads ‘Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to 
assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions’ and s 23, which guarantees the 
right to strike. Given the acrimonious nature of strikes where relations are strained and tempers 
are prone to boil over, as the argument goes, the exercise of these rights is hampered by the 
unfettered potential of paying damages for ‘any’ loss.  
 
A different ruling was meted out in the case of Mahlangu v SATAWU, Passenger Rail Agency 
of SA and Another460 where striking SATAWU members lured an unsuspecting replacement 
worker away from work with false promises of a better job in the city of Johannesburg. Whilst 
commuting on a train to the city and far from the site of the actual picket, the SATAWU 
members assaulted the replacement worker and threw her off the train after stripping her naked, 
sustaining serious injurious. Whilst accepting that the plaintiff’s assailants were SATAWU 
members involved in the strike, the court refused a claim for damages based on the proximity 
of where the picket was held and where the assault occurred.461 It is submitted that once a 
connection between the harm and the strike is established, this proximity test should not be a 
consideration; it is certainly not a requirement of the RGA. It cannot be that strikers can draw 
a line in the sand determining the geographic area of where liability will be incurred, and 
outside of that line, have carte blanche to do as they please, even assault and throw human 
beings off moving trains.  
 
It is doubtful that Wallis’ argument would have succeeded. The argument basically asks the 
court to weigh the s 17 right against, for instance, the right to human dignity462 and bodily 
integrity463 of everyone else not to be subjected to violence during gatherings, including strikes. 
In so doing, it asks the court to strike a balance between affording the freedom to gather whilst 
restricting the potential liability for damages, so as not to create a system that will be too 
cumbersome for unions to exercise these rights. In simple terms, on the one hand, meagre 
sanctions would promote the exercise of the right, but it also provides little incentive for unions 
to take steps to curb violence. On the other hand, substantial sanctions send a ‘chilling effect’ 
                                                          
460 (2014) 35 ILJ 1193 (GSJ). 
461 Ibid at 1212D. 
462 S 10 of the Constitution. 
463 S 12(2) of the Constitution. 
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to unions given the potential for liability, but this is a disincentive to exercise the right. It is 
submitted that given the levels of violence during strikes, which includes the violation of the 
fundamental right to life,464 this warrants heavy sanctions that will send out a strong message 
to would-be offenders that violence will not be tolerated and for that reason it submitted that 
the Constitutional Court would have found that the s 11 of the RGA restrictions are justifiable 
under s 36 of the Constitution. Further, Mogoeng CJ held that s 17 of the Constitution will be 
limited by the participants’ willingness to breach the peace.465 Therefore, the sanctions are 
aimed at limiting the willingness to be violent, not at discouraging the exercise of the right of 
assembly, as parties are still at liberty to assemble peacefully. The European Court of Human 
Rights has held: 
 
‘An individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of 
sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the 
demonstration, if the individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own 
intentions or behaviour.’466 
 
SATAWU did not even bother with this direct attack. 
 
b) Indirect attack 
 
SATAWU’s attack was premised on the argument that the defence provided to convenors of 
gatherings, namely s 11(2), is actually not a defence at all as it is so inadequate that any attempt 
to invoke it is bound to fail.467 Section 11(2) requires the convenors of gatherings to prove three 
things: 
 
‘(a) that he or it did not permit or connive at the act or omission which caused the 
damage in question; and 
                                                          
464 S 11 of the Constitution. 
465 Garvas (CC) para 35. Quoted with approval by Wallis J in Hotz v UCT (730/2016) [2016] ZASCA 159 (20 
October 2016) para 63. See also Rhodes University v Student Representative Council of Rhodes University & 
Others (1937/2016) [2016] ZAECGHC 141; [2017] 1 All SA 617 (ECG) (1 December 2016). 
466 Ziliberberg v Molodova ECHR (Application No 61821/00) para 2; Cisse v France ECHR (Application No 
51346/99) para 50; and Christians Against Racism & Fascism v United Kingdom (1998) 21 DR 138 (Application 
No 8440/78) para 4. 
467 Garvas (CC) para 35. 
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(b) that the act or omission in question did not fall within the scope of the objectives of 
the gathering or demonstration in question and was not reasonably foreseeable; and 
(c) that he or it took all reasonable steps within his or its powers to prevent the act or 
omission in question: Provided that proof that he or it forbade an act of the kind in 
question shall not by itself be regarded as sufficient proof that he or it took all 
reasonable steps to prevent the act in question.’ 
 
The crux of SATAWU’s contention in Garvas was that it cannot prove that the damage in 
question was not reasonably foreseeable and also prove that it took reasonable steps to prevent 
that very damage that was not foreseeable.468 It said ‘any reasonable organizer who takes 
reasonable steps to guard against an act or omission materializing could never prove that it 
was not reasonably foreseeable’.469 It contended that the result was irrational and was an 
impermissible restriction of its rights under s 17 of the Constitution. To this the Constitutional 
Court, as per Mogoeng CJ, held that what is reasonably foreseeable is inextricably connected 
to steps taken by convenors of the gathering to prevent damage.470 It held that an act or omission 
that caused damage would be unforeseeable if steps were taken to prevent such act or omission. 
In support of this decision Wallis writes: 
 
‘It may be reasonably foreseeable in South Africa that people will bring sticks and clubs 
to a protest or demonstration and that, if nothing is done about this, there is a possibility 
that they may use then to inflict injury or damage to property. However, if the 
organizers set up a system at the assembly point to ensure that sticks and clubs and 
other weapons are left behind in safe keeping, to be collected after the march, it seems 
difficult to say that, when the march commenced, they reasonably foresaw that people 
would have such items with them and use them to cause injury or damage. This suggests 
that when the issue of foreseeability is under consideration the court is primarily 
concerned with what was foreseeable at the commencement of the gathering, not with 
what might have been foreseen and catered for at some earlier stage in the organization 
of and preparation for the gathering.’471 
 
                                                          
468 SATAWU para 35.  
469 SATAWU para 42. 
470 SATAWU para 43. 
471 Wallis Note 27 at 2265. 
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This decision must be lauded for taking a major stride toward combatting the scourge of strike 
violence. It requires of conveners of gatherings to constantly take steps to prevent harm. This 
is also in keeping with the intended purpose of the RGA reinforcing the coexistence of the 
citizen’s right of assembly with the State’s duty to maintain law and order.472 In Xstrata v 
AMCU and Others,473 trade unions have in the past denied any wrongdoing on their own part 
or on the part of their members for unlawful actions of their members during violent strikes, to 
which the court held ‘union must not wash its hands off but must take steps to prevent members 
not to disregard the law’.474 Unions are required to proactively take steps to prevent harm on 




This chapter took a critical view at statutory remedies as per the LRA and the RGA. It was 
noted that interdicts are not as effective as they should be, given that they are often ignored by 
employees during violent strikes. It was submitted in the chapter that the courts adopt a more 
proactive and activist approach in attempting to restore respect to the courts and the rule of law 
by firstly, avoiding being perceived as antagonistic to the employees by telling them their strike 
serves no purpose, but rather by advising them that they seek to benefit from unlawful conduct. 
Secondly, the courts should be willing to be stricter on those who are guilty of contempt of 
court.  
 
We further noted that the courts have been excessively lenient on the unions in awarding ‘just 
and equitable’ compensation. The evidence lends itself to the view that the remedies have left 
employers in a precarious position where attaining meaningful recompense is but an illusion. 
Interdicts are but a mere chimera. With the exception of Algoa, the courts are awarding ‘just 
and equitable’ compensation that is far less than the loss actually incurred by employers. This 
does little towards stemming the flow of violence and it is time the courts relook at how they 
interpret ‘just and equitable’ compensation. We further analysed the employer’s remedy of 
dismissal. The dismissal should be both substantively and procedurally fair. 
 
                                                          
472 P de Vos. ... et al. South Africa Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 556. 
473 [2014] ZALCJHB 58 No. J1239/13 (25 February 2014). Available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCJHB/2014/58.pdf, accessed on 7 November 2017. 
474 Ibid at 17. 
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It is fitting that the chapter ended with the landmark case of Garvas. The Constitutional Court 
assessed s 11 of the RGA and arrived at a decision that should go a long way towards curbing 
strike violence by confirming that during a picket that meets the requirements of the RGA, 
unions will be held liable for the delicts committed by their members when certain 
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At the heart of this dissertation lies the right to strike and the role it plays in the collective 
bargaining system in South Africa. The right to strike is one of the fundamental rights available 
to workers in terms of the Constitution,475 and given effect to in ss 64 and 65 of the LRA of 
1995. Chapter 3 gives an in-depth analysis of the consequences of a protected strike, whilst 
Chapter 4 deals with the consequences of an unprotected strike. 
 
Strike violence taints the role played by strikes and solutions are sought to rid South Africa of 
strike-related violence. Perhaps one of the most devastatingly violent strikes is the Marikana 
Massacre where 34 mineworkers were killed, 78 wounded and more than 250 people were 
arrested.476 Strikes have become synonymous with violence in South Africa and solutions must 
be found as a matter of urgency. 
 
In the search of solutions, the dissertation critically outlined the legal framework regulating 
strikes. It was found that the framework does not make provision for balloting, provides for the 
use of replacement labour, and provides for the issuing of interdicts under certain 
circumstances. In Chapter 3, it was submitted that these factors contribute to structural 
violence, which causes strikers to retaliate with physical violence. A major factor that 
contributes to the structural violence is the current interpretation of majoritarianism. An 
alternative approach to majoritarianism, informed by Ubuntu, is proposed. The Ubuntu 
approach also informs the suggestion that the provision for replacement labour be repealed and 






                                                          
475 S 23 of the Constitution. 
476 Available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/marikana-massacre-16-august-2012, accessed on 17 May 
2017. 
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2 Majoritarianism – Ubuntu 
 
In Chapter 3, following a discussion about structural violence, majoritarianism was identified 
as an implement of oppression against members of the minority unions. The Constitutional 
Court in AMCU v Chamber of Mines of South Africa and Others477 recently considered the 
constitutionality of the majoritarianism principle and found that it is not an implement of 
oppression. It was submitted that the court did not adopt the correct approach and missed an 
opportunity to expand on the transformative interpretation jurisprudence, by including Ubuntu 
in the interpretation of the provisions of the LRA promoting majoritarianism. Ubuntu would 
see a move from an adversarial system, where opposing parties would use whatever is at their 
disposal to inflict harm on one another, to a communal system that promotes collegiality and 
peace in the workplace. Ubuntu is thus crucial for the creation of an environment conducive 
for prosperity and peace. Consistent with this form of majoritarianism premised on Ubuntu, is 




The dissertation suggests that the LRA revert back to the position under s 65(2)(b) of the 
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, where ballots were a requirement before the commencement 
of a strike. Its failure to curb strike violence is attributed to the political unrest of the time, but 
should produce the desired effects now that the political climate is relatively calm.478  
 
It is submitted that in order to give true meaning to majoritarianism, all workers, 
notwithstanding union affiliation, should be permitted to vote on an issue raised by workers. 
The LRA should be amended to create this purer application of majoritarianism. This will also 
serve to remind union leaders that their purpose is to serve the workers and should not use the 
power vested in them to push ulterior agendas, thus restoring trust between workers and unions. 
An added benefit is that those who are in the minority are not simply shunned when they raise 
an issue simply because they are the minority. They will be given an audience among 
colleagues, who will then vote after applying their minds. The result will be reduced 
                                                          
477 (CCT87/16) [2017] ZACC 3; (2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC); 2017 (3) SA 242 (CC); 2017 (6) BCLR 700 (CC); [2017] 7 BLLR 
641 (CC) (21 February 2017). 
478 Tenza Note 130 at 215. 
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frustrations and tensions in the workplace, which should in turn should reduce strike-related 
violence. Workers will be more inclined to create allies, rather than perpetuating rivalries and 
conflict, with one another, irrespective of union affiliation. This will make for a peaceful and 
more fruitful working environment. The current form of majoritarianism creates an adversarial 
environment where it is a case of ‘join us or we will oppress you’.  
 
It should also be borne in mind that most of the strikers are black Africans who are brought up 
with values of Ubuntu and when they reach the workplace, they come into contact with this 
adversarial form of majoritarianism, hence the need to tailor our majoritarianism to suit our 
culture and Ubuntu. This is the approach that the legislature, and Cameron J, in AMCU v 
Chamber of Mines, should have adopted in labour disputes. It was this spirit of camaraderie 
that ultimately won the freedom of South Africa from its oppressors; it is this spirit that will 
economically emancipate the downtrodden. 
 
4 Replacement labour 
 
The use of replacement labour is identified as one of the causes of strike violence as it is a 
blatant form of structural violence against workers.479 The employer is permitted to enforce the 
‘no work, no pay’ rule480 to inflict economic harm on employees, and employers are permitted 
to carry on production during a strike, thus undermining, if not totally eradicating, the economic 
pressure the workers are trying to exert on the employer by striking.481 The same rationale 
applies to non-striking employees. 
 
The proportionality system, being informed by Ubuntu, envisaged a win-win solution where 
all stakeholders are forced to work together for the common good. In short, the system entails 
that the amount paid to employees is reduced by the percentage in the reduction of productivity. 
                                                          
479 S 76. Replacement labour 
‘(1) An employer may not take into employment any person— 
(a) to continue or maintain production during a protected strike if the whole or a part of the employer’s 
service has been designated a maintenance service; or 
(b) for the purpose of performing the work of any employee who is locked out, unless the lock-out is in 
response to a strike. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, “take into employment” includes engaging the services of a temporary 
employment service or an independent contractor.’ 
480 S 67(3) of the LRA.  
481 Tenza Note 130 at 219. 
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The amount paid out is shared among the entire staff complement in proportion to their normal 
salary/wages, regardless of who was on strike or who was working. An agreement (either on 
an ad hoc basis, or through a collective agreement, or to be compulsorily agreed upon at 
conciliation before a certificate of non-resolution is issued, or through a ministerial 
promulgation regulating an industry) will be put in place that a certain number, or percentage, 
of the staff complement will work during a strike in order to preserve the business so that 
strikers still have a job to return to after the strike. 
 
The system will promote collegiality among all the employees, strikers and non-strikers. 
Instead of viewing one another as adversaries, the spirit of inter-dependence will reign where 
the strikers rely on non-strikers to generate some income and sustain the business, whilst the 
non-strikers rely on the strikers to brave the elements and toyi toyi, garner support for their 
cause, negotiate with the employer and hopefully succeed in winning better working conditions 
for staff members. With the implementation of this system, gruesome scenes of violent attacks 
between strikers against replacement workers or non-striking employees will be a thing of the 
past. 
 
The employer will not need to hire replacement workers — whom the employer may even need 
to train and upskill for the job — so it will also benefit the employer. Consistent with Ubuntu, 
employers and employees will recognise and embrace their dependence on one another, thereby 
removing the adversarial view or objective of proving to each other that they are invaluable. 
This approach overall benefits both employers and employees. 
 
5 Two-stage interdict 
 
This recommendation seeks to limit the infringement of the right to strike. The legitimate 
objectives of a strike are distinct from the unlawful acts carried out by strikers in attempting to 
obtain those legitimate ends. Interdicts that prohibit a strike that has turned violent stifles, not 
only the unlawful conduct, but the legitimate objectives of the strike, leading to defiance, 
contempt of court, and more violence. 
 
The purpose is to stop the unlawful aspects of the strike, not the legitimate ends. It may be 
more effective for the court to issue an interdict prohibiting the unlawful conduct, whilst 
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permitting the strikers to pursue the legitimate objectives of the strike. This will be the first 
interdict, which comes with a stern warning that the court will not permit anyone to gain any 
advantage from their own unlawful conduct and, as such, if the unlawful conduct does not stop, 
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